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THE ROLE OF THE NATIONAL ENERGY
BOARD IN CONTROLLING THE EXPORT
OF NATURAL GAS FROM CANADA
BARRY D. FISHER*

1. INTRODUCTION
The export of Canada's primary resources to the United States has
become a major contemporary issue to Canadians. This is particularly true
of the export of Canadian energy resources and there is currently a controversy over whether Canada should continue to export energy. Views range
from support of U.S.-proposed continental energy schemes to charges that
the sale of any energy is a sell-out by Canada of the country's resources and
is contrary to the country's interests and will make Canada more dependent
on the U.S. economically and politically.
Canada's energy resources are substantial-oil, gas and atomic-and
there is a history of the export of these resources to the United States. In this
paper the writer will examine the formulation of policies towards the export
of natural gas. Gas was chosen as the subject of discussion because there is
a well developed system designed to protect Canadian interests by regulating
exports. Since the 1947 discovery of substantial petroleum reserves, both oil
and gas have been exported to the United States. However the pattern
developed differently for gas and oil. While Western Canadian gas supplies
have been tied to the major Eastern Canadian markets by pipe line, this is
not the case with oil. The National Oil Policy has divided Canada along the
Ottawa River: East of this boundary only imported oil (mainly from Venezuela) is used, while to the West only Canadian crude is used. Because of
U.S. domestic policies (the Mandatory Oil Import Program) the export
market for Western Canadian oil has been very limited. But gas has always
been treated differently and has virtually free access to U.S. markets. As a
result Canada has been forced to formulate a policy towards the export of
this resource. Stating the problem is simple. Natural gas is a depleting resource and the object of all resource development should be to maximize the
benefit to Canada. The question which follows is whether Canada should
continue to export natural gas, and if so, on what terms?
The National Energy Board was established in 1959 to manage the
export of natural gas. In this paper the writer will attempt to consider whether
the Board has been effective and whether it is the appropriate body to make
these decisions.
*Member of the 1971 Graduating Class of Osgoode Hall Law School, York
University.
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2. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE OIL AND GAS INDUSTRY
AND EXPORT CONTROLS
a. Pre-1947
While natural gas in Canada has attained national significance only since
1947, gas was discovered as early as 1883 in Alberta and 1888 in Ontario.'
These discoveries and others in subsequent years2 led to the early commercial use of natural gas. By 1910, Calgary was served by gas and by 1912 a
natural gas pipe line connected the city to the Bow Island well. 3
The gas discovered in Ontario was used to service Southern Ontario
and Detroit, and represents the first significant natural gas export to the
United States. The rapid exploitation of these reserves for export threatened
rapid depletion and resulted in implementation of the export controls in the
Electricity and Fluids Exportation Act, 4 passed by Parliament in 1907. The
legislation required a licence for gas export, issued by the Minister of Trade
and Commerce. 5
The Province of Alberta was marked by a frenzy of exploration for oil
and stock promotion in the 1920's and 1930's, but natural gas was only of
marginal importance, being sold only to local markets. All efforts were
directed at the discovery of oil, and vast quantities of natural gas which could
not be used locally were flared at the well, and wasted. In 1938, the Alberta
Petroleum and Natural Gas Conservation Board was established and a system
of prorating was introduced to regulate the output of the large number of
wells and maintain a quota system.6 The Board was also charged with imposing conservation measures to deal with the problems of inefficient operation,
through excessive rates of production, and the problem of gas waste. During
this period, natural gas exports were relatively insignificant.
b.

1947-1959

The 1947 Imperial Oil discovery of the Leduc field, in Southern Alberta
was an important turning point in the development of the industry,7 since
along with the gas discovered in other fields reserves were sufficient to generate an interest in export schemes. However, there was strong public opposition to these schemes in Alberta, on the grounds that exports would result
in increased local gas prices, would deplete supplies required for Alberta's
use, and would result in the loss to the province of gas-dependant industries
1 Gray, The
Great Canadian Oil
2 For accounts

Patch (1970), at 59-60.
of the early history of gas discoveries.in Canada, see Gray, id., at
59 if; Hanson, Dynamic Decade (1958), at 40-58; Leeston, Crichton, and Jacobs, The
Dynamic Natural Gas Industry (1963).
84 Interestingly this line, 170 miles long, was at the time the world's longest pipe line.
Electricity and Fluid Exportation Act, S.C. 1907, c. 16.
5 Id., Little information is available on the use of export controls in this legislation,
but gas exports were of only minor importance until the 1950's. The legislation continued in effect until 1955 when it was replaced by the Exportation of Power and Fluids
and Importation of Fluids Act, S.C. 1955, c. 14, discussed infra.
GHanson, supra at 49. Pro-rationing takes on importance when there is a large
number
of producing wells and a limited number of buyers.
7
See Hanson, supra and Gray, supra, for a detailed discussion of the discoveries
and developments in this period, and the early schemes to remove gas from the Province.
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which would locate elsewhere if gas was exported. 8 Albertans particularly
feared the loss of a very cheap form of energy they had long enjoyed. The
political pressure led to the appointment of the Dinning Royal Commission
in 1948, to enquire into the relationship of reserves to provincial consumption. In its Report, in 1949,1 the Commission estimated the Province's gas
requirements for 50 years and concluded that exports from the Province might
be justified, but it recommended that Albertans should have prior claim on
the use of the resource, and that Canadian users should have priority over gas
removed from the Province.
In 1949, the Gas Resources PreservationAct 0 was passed, based on the
Dinning Recommendations. It provided that gas which was surplus to reasonably foreseeable provincial requirements could be removed from the province by export permit, issued by the Oil and Gas Conservation Board.
A number of applications for export permits, based on competing proposals designed to serve three different markets, were filed with the Board
in 1950. Three companies sought to serve the U.S. Pacific Coast market, two
the Eastern Canadian market and one company applied to serve the Montana
market." The Board initially refused all the applications, in early 1951, since
the current reserves were considered inadequate, but the parties were invited
to re-apply in September, 1951. In March, 1952, the Board again rejected all
applications, except the Westcoast proposal which was approved. The export
projects which emerged will be described briefly.
The Southern B.C. and U.S. Pacific Northwest Markets
The schemes contemplated the removal of gas from the Peace River
areas of Northern Alberta to British Columbia, where together with gas
from the recently discovered reserves in the B.C. Peace River district, the
total supply would be sent throught B.C. by pipe line to the Vancouver
area, which would be supplied by gas, and from where the gas would be
exported to the U.S. Pacific Northwest markets. The Canadian Government
issued the necessary export licence in 1953, but the project was set back
by the refusal in 1954 of the U.S. Federal Power Commission to grant the
necessary import permit.12 The FPC had instead approved a proposal by
8

Gray, supra at 164-5.
9
The
discussion is based on the account of the Report in Gray, supra at 164-5.
10
Gas Resources Preservations Act, S.A. 1949, c. 17. This legislation was subsequently re-enacted with changes as the Gas Resources Preservation Act, 1956, S.A.
1956, c. 19, which is the basis of the present Alberta control. See Energy Resources
Conservation Act, S.A. 1971.
1
For a more complete discussion of the proposals, see Hanson, supra at 227-231;
Alberta, Oil and Gas Conservation Board, Gas Export 1950-60, January 1961 (A summary of Board proceedings compiled by D. P. Goodall). [The Oil and Gas Conservation
Board will be referred to hereinafter as the "OGCB"; The Federal Power Commission
as the "FPC"; and the National Energy Board as the 'WEB"].
12 The details of the Westcoast export are discussed in full in the Report of the
Borden Commission loc. cit., f.n. 15, at 13-24. The disposition is discussed, infra, Section
5. C(3) ). The main reason for rejection was that U.S. consumers would not be adequately protected if the sole source of supply for the Northwest market was from
imports. Apparently, the converse, that an American market would be dependent on
Canada, did not trouble any of the Canadian decision makers, at least not enough to
result in refusal to grant export authorization.
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Pacific Northwest Pipeline Corporation to supply this market with gas from
U.S. supplies, and refused to let the U.S. market become dependent on Canadian gas supplies. In December, 1954, the two companies agreed to a new
gas sale which rescued the pipe line project and assured Southern B.C. of a
pipe line supply of natural gas. Approval of the new arrangement was received
from all three bodies (the OGCB, Canadian Government,1 3 and FPC) and
the project was completed in 1956.
The result of the initial FPC rejection had been to place the entire project in jeopardy since the U.S. market was essential to the successful financing
of the pipe line. As a result of Westcoast's weak bargaining position the 1954
export contract was made at a price which was unfavourably low. This arrangement continued to be criticized long after. For example, in its Report
of 1957 the Gordon Royal Commission14 criticized the structure of export
arrangements and noted in particular that the power of the FPC, and the
resulting effect on Canadian export prices and recommended the creation of
a "national energy authority". In 1958 the Borden Commission gave detailed
consideration to the contracts as well as to certain aspects of the financing
of the project, and found that the U.S. exports were not a source of profit
to the company.1 5
The Eastern Canadianand Northeastern U.S. Market
Two competing proposals emerged to serve the eastern market areas.
Western Pipe Lines proposed to build a pipe line east to Winnipeg and from
there south to the U.S. border at Emerson, Manitoba, for export to the
Minnesota and North Dakota markets. Canadian Delhi Oil proposed to build
a line as far east as Montreal, based on a market restricted to Canada. The
project which eventually evolved stands as one of the most interesting ventures in Canadian history and culminated in the Great Pipe Line Debate of
1956 and the defeat of the Liberal Government in 1957.16
In 1951 Canadian Delhi obtained a charter for Trans-Canada Pipe Lines,
as a wholly-owned subsidiary, under the Pipe Lines Act.17 The eastern pipe
line project proposals were both rejected by the OGCB in March, 1952 and
18 The Canadian government issued a licence in June, 1955, for 20 years at a
maximum of 125 billion cubic feet per year, under the Exportation of Power and
Fluids and Importation of Fluids Act, supra. This was the only major export permit

granted under this legislation that came to the attention of the writer.
14
Canada, Royal Commission on Canada's Economic Prospects, Final Report,
(November, 1957, Walter Gordon, Chairman).
15 Canada, Royal Commission on Energy, First Report, (October, 1958, Henry
Borden, Chairman). [Hereafter cited as "Borden Commission, FirstReport".]
16 For an interesting and more complete discussion of the development of these
proposals and in particular the history of the Trans-Canada Pipe Line and the Great
Pipe Line Debate of 1956 in the House of Commons, see Kilbourn, Pipe Line (1970).
See also Gray, supra, at 177-218; Borden Commission, First Report, at 54-88.
17 Pipe Lines Act, S.C. 1949, c. 20, R.S.C. 1952. Later repealed and replaced by
the National Energy Board Act, S.C. 1959, c. 46
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again in November, 1953.18 Following the latter decision, the Alberta Government (through Premier Ernest Manning) and the Canadian Government
(through Minister of Trade and Commerce C. D. Howe) interceded in order
to salvage the projects. This resulted in the merger of Trans-Canada and
Western in January 1954 to form Trans-Canada Pipe Lines. In May the
Alberta Board authorized the export from the Province.' 9
Howe was committed to the principle of an all-Canadian pipe line,
located entirely within Canada, 20 and supplying Western Canadian gas to
the Eastern Canadian markets. But these criteria complicated the financing
of the project and almost resulted in its failure. In November, 1955, the
Ontario and Federal Governments agreed to save the project through the
instrumentality of a Crown Corporation which would build the Northern
Ontario section of the line and lease it to Trans-Canada, which would eventually purchase the line. An export component was integral to the scheme. It
is noteworthy that this export helped finance the line, and in effect, led to
the integration of the Western gas supplies and the Eastern Market.
A temporary "displacement" arrangement was incorporated, whereby
Trans-Canada would build the first stage of the line to Manitoba and export
part of the gas at Emerson, Manitoba to Midwestern Gas Transmission, a
subsidiary of Tennessee Gas Transmission; Tennessee would supply gas to
Ontario from U.S. sources, through Niagara. Thus, while the Northern
Ontario line was under construction, the Ontario market would be served, and
when completed the Ontario import would end, and would be replaced by
a small export at Niagara, and the export at Emerson would continue, at a
reduced level. 21
The events that followed form an important chapter in Canadian Parliamentary history-the Great Pipe Line Debate of 1956. Since time was
critical to the project and its financing, the Government tried to force the legislation creating the Crown Corporation through the House of Commons
18 Gray, supra, at 185-6. Westcoast had been granted a permit in March, 1952,
since a surplus of gas was found for the Peace River gas reserves, but the Board determined that there was not a surplus of gas in the rest of the Province. In its November,
1953 decision, the Board approved the export permit of Canadian-Montana Pipe Line
and determined that there was a surplus of gas sufficient to supply either of the eastern
proposals. But the applications were both refused because of the economics of the
projects, and in the case of Western, because of the price. OGCB, Gas Export 1950-60,
supra at 43-48, 92-96.
19 See Kilbourn, supra, for a discussion, esp. at 34 ff.
2
0 This meant locating the pipe line north of the Lakehead and going through the
rocky terrain of Northern Ontario, a more expensive method than the producerproposed project to route the line south of the Great Lakes through the U.S. The producers were interested in a more export-oriented project, which they reasoned would
bring higher prices than the Canadian market. This Federal Government commitment
to the "all Canadian pipe line policy" was to become an issue again in 1966, when
Trans-Canada sought to route a new line through the U.S.A., south of the Lakes.
21 This displacement scheme was integral to the project, in that it permitted the
development of the Ontario market and the effect utilization of the Western part of
the line until the Northern Ontario line was completed. However displacement schemes
have subsequently been rejected by the Government policy. Thus, in 1966, the proposal
of Northern Natural of the U.S. to augment supplies to Ontario through a displacement
scheme, rather than a pipe line, never got off the ground.
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amidst confusion about the nature of the plan and charges that private parties
would profit from Government assistance in the financing. The famous debate
that followed was not concerned with the merits of the scheme, but rather
with the way the Government was handling the matter in Parliament. This
contributed to the Liberal Government defeat in the 1957 election. The pipe
line proceeded and in October, 1958, the all-Canadian system was completed. While Western Canadian gas supplies were successfully integrated
with the Eastern Canadian market, there were many unanswered questions
about the project. The study of these matters by two Royal Commissions
led directly to the creation of the NEB.
The Establishmentof the NationalEnergy Board
The Gordon Commission, which reported in 1957, 22 had pointed to the
inadequacy of information on Canada's energy resources and the weak bargaining position of Canadian producers, which had resulted in the 1954
Westcoast export contract, on most unfavourable terms. It recommended the
formation of a comprehensive energy policy and the establishment of a
"national energy authority to advise the Government on energy matters and
approve all contracts for the export of gas, oil and power. '23
In 1957, the new Conservative Government appointed the Borden Royal
Commission on Energy, to study the energy situation, the financing of TransCanada Pipe Lines, and other matters and to make recommendations about
the formation of a National Energy Board and how gas exports should be
treated.2 4 In its First Report,25 the Commission considered the Westcoast
export contracts and financing and the Trans-Canada financing,26 and recommended that gas export be permitted by licence. 27 The Commission had
no criticism of the handling of the financing of Trans-Canada 28 although it did
point to the need for the NEB and it made specific recommendations on
the formation of the Board and the control of the export of natural gas.
The Government acted quickly on the recommendations and introduced
legislation in May of 1959 and the National Energy Board Act2" was passed
in July.
C. Since 1959
By late 1959 the National Energy Board had been established and it
held its first export hearings in January, 1960. These included the final dispo22 Canada, Royal Commission on Canada's Economic Prospects, Final Report, November, 1957. (Walter Gordon, Chairman). [Hereafter cited ar "Gordon Commission"].
The Commission sponsored a study of Canadian energy resources, Davis, Canadian
Energy Prospects (1957), which reviewed energy supplies and markets, including exports.
23 Id., chapter 7, esp. at 146.
24 P.C. 1957-1386.
25 Borden Commission, First Report. The Commission issued a Second Report
(July, 1959), which dealt mainly with the Canadian oil market and supply situation.
28 Id., at 13-24, 54-88.
2
7Id., at 1-13.
28 Cf. Kilbourn, supra, at 164-66.
29
National Energy Board Act, S.C. 1959, c. 46, as amended, Re-enacted as R.S.C.
1970, c. N-6 [Hereinafter referred to as the "Act".] The Cabinet has promulgated

regulations under the Act, National Energy Board Part VI Regulations, P.C. 1959 -

1411, as amended. [Hereinafter referred to as the "Regulations".]
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sition of the Trans-Canada application for export at Emerson, Manitoba, 80
and other export applications totalling 6.7 trillion cubic feet.
An entirely new export project developed in the late 1950's. Alberta
and Southern Natural Gas, a subsidiary of Pacific Gas and Electric, was incorporated to supply Albertan gas to the Northern California market of
Pacific Gas and Electric,31 through a pipe line which was wholly export32
oriented.
In the early 1960's there was a rapid expansion of the Eastern Canadian
gas market and consequently a need for increased pipe line capacity to serve
the market. This resulted in the emergence of Trans-Canada's Great Lakes
project, whereby Canadian gas would be carried to Eastern markets by a pipe
line south of the Great Lakes through the U.S. This project was eventually
approved
by the necessary regulatory bodies and was completed in October,
3
1968.
The most recent major pipe line project proposal emerged in 1969. 84
Northern Natural Company of the U.S.A., incorporated Consolidated Natural
Gas Company in Canada to export a large volume of gas to serve the
Minneapolis and Wisconsin markets, but their application was refused by the
National Energy Board in September, 1970.
D. The Present Situation3
Most of Canada's proven natural gas reserves are in Western Canada,
predominantly Alberta, with reserves in British Columbia, and lesser amounts
in Saskatchewan, while the major Canadian energy market is in Eastern
Canada - Ontario and Quebec. Trans-Canada Pipe Lines represents the
30_Although C. D. Howe had committed the Canadian Government to granting
an export licence, by letter, the Borden Commission had recommended that this be
considered of no effect and the question be considered anew by the NEB.
31See Miller, Foreign Trade in Gas and Electricity - A Legal and Historical
Study (1970), at 107-8, 119-121. Alberta and Southern Gas Company Ltd. purchases
gas from Alberta producers which is transported by Alberta Gas Trunk Line Company
Ltd. to the B.C.-Alberta boundary from where it is carried by Alberta Natural Gas
Company to the U.S. border at Kingsgate, B.C., where delivery is made to Pacific Gas
Transmission, which carries the gas to the California border where Pacific Gas and
Electric takes it. All these companies are owned or controlled by Pacific Gas and
Electric, with the exception of Alberta Gas Trunk which is semi-public Alberta corporation owned by gas producers, processors, utilities and gas exporters, and is regulated
by the Alberta Government.
32
The export was approved by the NEB in March, 1960. The Canadian-Montana
Pipe Line, approved in the 1950's and serving the Montana market is also wholly
export-oriented, although the volume of gas is much smaller than the Alberta and
Southern project.
83 This project is discussed in greater detail, infra, Section 6.
34 NEB Report (August, 1970). Discussed throughout this paper.
5 See generally, National Energy Board, Certain Aspects of Canadian Experience
with Natural Gas (Presentation to a Special Committee of the OECD Energy Committee, Paris, September 22, 1967). Also appears as an Appendix in OECD, Impact of
Natural Gas on the Consumption of Energy in the OECD European Member Countries,
Paris, 1969; Fraser, Lugg, Petroleum and Natural Gas Industry in Canada 1963-1968
(Ottawa, Mineral Resources Branch, Department of Energy, Mines and Resources,
1970).
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realization of a Federal Government policy enunciated by C. D. Howe in
the mid-1950's, to supply natural gas to Eastern Canada through an allCanadian pipe line, wholly within Canada. As a result natural gas has become
an important energy source even in Eastern Canada. The B.C. market is
served by the Westcoast project. Gas export has always been an important
element of both these projects. There are also two wholly export-oriented
projects, the Canadian-Montana pipe line, and the Alberta and Southern
Alberta Natural Gas project of Pacific Gas and Electric.
Today, natural gas exports account for a substantial portion of gas
production. In 1968, 604 Bcf 36 were exported, comprising approximately
40% of the total production of 1493 Bcf.3 7 The United States is currently
facing a severe energy shortage, particularly in natural gas and if Canada
is prepared to sell there is certainly a large future export market.
While most of the current gas reserves are located in the Western Canadian Sedimentary Basin, the projected potential reserve areas include the
possibility of major producing areas in the Arctic Islands and in the Atlantic
Offshore areas.18 The Canadian Petroleum Association projects ultimate potential reserves of 724.8 Tcf, which should be compared with the present
established reserves determined by the National Energy Board to be 57.4 Tcf
at the end of 1969.39 There have been major discoveries in the Arctic area
already, but none of significance off the East coast. The production and
marketing of these supplies will undoubtedly be controversial issues in the
next decade, because of the ecological risks involved.
3. THE NATIONAL ENERGY BOARD ACT AND
THE FUNCTIONS OF THE BOARD
A.

The Structure of the Board and its Members

The Board was established in 1959 by the National Energy Board Act"
which implemented most of the recommendations of the Borden Commission's
80 The standard measurement of natural gas is in cubic feet at atmospheric conditions. The following abbreviations are commonly used:
1 Mcf = 1000 cubic feet
1 MMcf = 1,000,000 cubic feet (million)
I Bcf
= 1,000,000,000 cubic feet (billion)
1 Tcf
= 1,000,000,000,000 cubic feet (trillion)
87
Fraser, Lugg, supra at 154-64.
88 See National Energy Board, Energy Supply and Demand in Canada and Export
Demand for Canadian Energy, 1966-1990 (1969); and the estimates of the Canadian

Petroleum Association of potential reserves in NEB Report (August, 1970), at 4-10-11.
sDNEB Report (August, 1970)) at 4-13.
40The Board is created as a court of record, with the powers of a superior court
of record with respect to witnesses, documents, and enforcement of its orders. (Act,
ss. 10, 15). Orders may be enforced by making them a rule of the Federal Court or any
superior court, and mandatory orders may be issued. (s. 12). The Board is empowered
to initiate proceedings and inquiries on its own ss. 11, 14(2) ), and may (1) change
or rescind orders and decisions (s. 17(1) ); and (2) change (but not rescind, apparently)
pipe line certificates and export licences (s. 17(2) ). The writer is unaware of any
proceedings using these powers with respect to the export of natural gas. In fact, in
its August, 1970 Report, the Board indicated that it would be adverse to using the s. 17
powers in respect of existing export licences.
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First Report.41 The Board performs both advisory and regulatory functions.
While the focus of this paper is on the regulatory functions of the Board, it
should be emphasized that the advisory functions are of equal, and perhaps
Board Members, increased from five by
greater importance. There are seven
42

the 1970 amendments to the Act.

Consideration of the role played by individual members in policymaking is difficult because of their limited public exposure. NEB members
have participated in public discussion only to a limited extent, while FPC
Commissioners make speeches and otherwise enter public discussion quite
frequently. In Canada, the attention in energy matters is focused on the
Minister of Energy, Mines and Resources. 43 It would be useful for Members
of the NEB to participate in public discussion, to promote knowledgeable discussion about gas export policy, as well as to let public discussion influence
the thinking of Members.
There is an apparent Board policy of issuing only unanimous decisions in
their Reports. By contrast, the FPC issues decisions in individual's names,
and includes dissenting decision. The NEB only indicates the various arguments put forward by parties on various issues, in its Reports, and never
recognizes dissent amongst Members or indeed amongst the Board's Staff.
Whether the Board should adopt a policy similar to the FPC depends on
one's view of the role of the Board. If dissenting opinions were published then
a potential problem would be presented to the Government which effectively
gives approval to the policies of the Board, in the form of Cabinet approval
of decisions.
B.

The Advisory Function

From the earliest discussions about the formation of the National Energy
Board considerable emphasis was placed on this aspect of the Board's funcCommission, First Report, op. cit.
Act, s. 3(1), as amended. Members are appointed by the Governor in Council.
The number of members was increased because of the increased work load of the Board,
particularly recent long hearings. The most recent export hearing (NEB Report, August,
1970) lasted 54 hearing days, from November 25, 1969 to March 20, 1970. An application
by Trans-Canada Pipe Lines to increase its rates (Act, Part IV) is expected to last at
least that long. Since the quorum requirement of a hearing panel of the Board remains
at 3 (s.6(2) ), it will be possible in future to form two panels and overlap hearings.
In addition this will free the Members to devote more time to advisory functions than
in past. because of the work load. Members are Cabinet-appointed for 7 years (Act, s.
3(1) ) and hold office during good behaviour, subject to removal by the Cabinet upon
address of the Senate and House of Commons. Members must be Canadian citizens and
are prevented from holding any interest in the petroleum or power industry (s. 3(5) ) or
holding "any office or employment inconsistent with their duties and functions under this
Act." (s. 3(8) ).
43
It should be pointed out that a fundamental difficulty is presented by the Canadian political system, which adheres to the concept of Ministerial responsibility and
accordingly conflicts with emphasis on the role of civil servants and regulatory bodies.
However, it seems clear that in formulating energy policies, the latter groups have
played a dominant role, as evidenced by the almost uniform policy towards export of
gas over the last 10 to 20 years (discussed later). If the regulatory bodies are to continue playing a major role then this should be publicly recognized.
41Borden
42
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tions. 44 They were given prominence, as Part H of the Act, which imposes a
heavy duty on the Board:
22. (1) The Board shall study and keep under review matters over which the
Parliament of Canada has jurisdiction relating to the exploration for, production,
recovery, manufacture, processing, transmission, transportation, distribution, sale,
purchase, exchange and disposal of energy and sources of energy within and
outside of Canada, shall report thereon from time to time to the Minister and shall
recommend to the Minister such measures within the jurisdiction of the Parliament of Canada as it considers necessary or advisable in the public interest for
the control, supervision, conservation, use, marketing and development of energy
and sources of energy.
(2) The Board shall, at the request of the Minister, prepare studies and reports
on any matter relating to energy or sources of energy and shall recommend to
the Minister the making of such arrangements as it considers desirable for cooperation with governmental or other agencies in or outside Canada in respect
of matters relating to energy and sources of energy.
(3) In carrying out its duties and functions under this section, the Board shall,
wherever appropriate, utilize agencies of the Government of Canada to obtain
technical, economic and statistical information and advice. 45

Thus the Board functions as a Government advisor on energy policy, making
recommendations directly to the Miniser.4" This function includes all forms
of energy and energy sources and is not restricted to oil, gas, and electric
power, which are the limit of the regulatory functions.
Any evaluation of the Board's functions in this area is necessarily
limited by the requirements of Cabinet secrecy. Reports made under this
Part are only made public with the approval of the Minister.47 While some
reports have been published,4948 these represent only a small part of the
Boards' activities in this area.
One of the most important aspects of activity is the Board's continuing
study of energy resources in Canada, their supply and their demand. Coupled
with this, the Board studies the energy supply and demand situation in the
U.S.A., and to a lesser extent that in other countries, particularly the oil
44

See for example, Borden Commission, First Report, op. cit., at 43-53. The
Commission recommended (at 43):
That a National Energy Board be established ... as a permanent board to study
and to recommend to the Governor in Council policies designed to assure to the
people of Canada the best use of the energy and sources of energy in Canada.
The Commission also recommended specific measures which were enacted and
are discussed, infra.
45 Act, s. 22. In exercising its Part II functions the Board is given powers under
the Inquiries Act.
46The relationship with the Cabinet is discussed, infra, Section 6.
47
Act, s. 23. The Minister refers to the Minister of Energy, Mines and Resources.
48 These are reports of a technical nature, concerned mainly with operation research
studies of the gas industry and energy demand forecasting techniques.
40
In the course of his research the writer tried to obtain a copy of a historical
review of Canada's energy policies tabled by the Board with the Energy Committee of
the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. The Board serves as
"the focal point for Canada's contribution to the energy activities of the OECD." Annual
Report (1969), p. 28. However, the Board Chairman advised the writer that this was
a confidential document and would not be released, at least not immediately, in the
interest of Canadian security. Surely if a document can be released internationally to
foreign governments then it should be open to the Canadian public.

19711

OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL

producing countries. Their surveillance of supply and demand is of considerable importance to the decisions made on particular gas export applications,
since the Act requires the Board to be satisfied that the quantity of gas to be
exported "does not exceed the surplus remaining after due allowance has been
made for the reasonably foreseeable requirements for use in Canada."5 If the
Board were placed in a position of dependance on industry-submitted data
its effectiveness would decrease. The Board bases its determination of gas
reserves on its own interpretation of geological data from wells, as provided
by producers. In aid of its reserve-estimating activities the Board maintains
a small office in Calgary,5 1 and maintains a close relationship with the Alberta
Oil and Gas Conservation Board.
Perhaps the most striking aspect of the Board's advisory function, is an
absence of published discussion of the underlying questions through the whole
discussion of energy export in general, and gas in particular, namely should
Canada continue to export energy or energy sources. Certainly this question
falls within the Board's jurisdiction. In view of the importance of the question,
particularly against the background of U.S.-proposed continental energy planning, this question should surely be the object of greater study by the Board,
than is obvious from the available published material. While the Board
recently published a study52 on energy supply and demand, it contains no discussion of the underlying policy issues.
C.

Regulatory Functions

The Board's regulatory jurisdiction extends only to electric, gas, and
oil and does not include other forms of energy or energy sources such as
coal, atomic energy, or water resources. Three main types of regulatory control are exercised:
(1) Certification of interprovincial pipe lines5" and international
power lines5 4 ;
(2) Rate regulation; 55
(3) Exports and imports: This includes the export of power, gas, and
oil and the import of gas and oil.56 The power over oil exports is
not exercised to date, but in the event of future substantial oil sales
to the U.S., this will become important. The National Oil Policy
which dictates that the oil market west of the Ottawa River should
be supplied by Western Canadian oil exclusively, but the market
east of the boundary should be supplied by imported oil, is based
on the Board's power over imports.
50

Act, s. 83 (a). This provision is discussed in greater detail, infra, Section 5. B.
Canada, National Energy Board, Annual Report for the Year Ended December
31, 1967, p. 28 [Hereinafter cited as "Annual Report (1967)".]
52
NEB, Energy Supply and Demand in Canada and Export Demand for Canadian
Energy, 1966-1990, supra, footnote 38.
58 Act, ss. 26, 38, 34.
54 Id., ss. 43, 2(b), 2(r).
551d., Part IV, s. 50. This power is only being exercised this year, following the
application of Trans-Canada Pipe Lines to increase its rates.
5
BAct, ss. 81-82, 87.
51
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4. EXPORT APPLICATION PROCEEDINGS

A.

Authority to Export Gas

57
Part VI of the Act, provides a general prohibition on the export of
58
natural gas:

Except as provided in the regulations, no person shall export any gas or power
or import any gas except under the authority of and in accordance with a licence
issued under this Part.59

There are three procedures whereby gas exports may be authorized:
(1) Export Licences. The Board is empowered to issue export licences, 60
which authorize specified export levels for a specified term which may be a
maximum of 25 years. 61 Licences are subject to Cabinet approval.
(2) Export "Orders". Further procedures may be implemented by regulation.
Two such procedures have been introduced:
(a) A 1966 amendment to the Regulations added a procedure whereby the
Board can authorize, by order, the export of one million cubic feet of gas
per day for a term of 20 years, subject to Cabinet approval. 2 It should be
noted that the provision does not state any criteria to be considered63by the

Board, while there are very specific criteria with respect to licences.
(b) Under the second procedure, the Board may authorize exports:

Where, in the opinion of the Board, emergency conditions have arisen that have
caused or may cause an interruption in the supply of gas to consumers in the
United States of America served by pipe lines in Canada, the Board may, by
order, authorize a person operating a pipe line to export gas in such amounts
and for such periods of time as the Board considers necessary, and upon such
terms and conditions as the Board may prescribe. 4

It is understood that this section is used several times a year to authorize
minor exports where there is a U.S. shortage of gas due to a U.S. pipe line
break or other temporary emergency conditions. That this is possible is some
indication of the degree of interconnection of Canadian and U.S. pipe lines.
57 "Export" is defined broadly, Act, s. 2(d): "export" means ... (ii) with reference
to gas or oil to send from Canada by any means.
58 "Gas" is defined for the purpose of Part VI, Act, s. 80A(a): "gas" means
natural gas or any fluid hydrocarbons other than oil. The definition of oil, s. 80A (b)
(iii): "any natural gasoline or condensate resulting from the production, processing,
or refining of gas" effectively excludes controls on the export of the liquid by-products
of natural gas, since they are exempted from the operation of Part VI of the Act and
the Part VI Regulations, Regulations, s. 22 (as amended by P.C. 1970-1419). However
control is retained over certification of pipe lines carrying these products.
59
Act, s. 81.
OId., s. 82.
61 Regulations, s. 9 (a) pursuant to Act, s. 85 (b). In case of provinces with their own
controls over removal of gas from the province the term is further limited to the
provincially authorized term. Regulations, s. 9(a).
62
Regulations, s. 6B (Added by P.C. 1966-427, SOR/66-188). This would be
equivalent to 6.3 Bcf over a 20 year term, while current export licences typically authorize volumes of 1-2 Tcf, about 15 to 30 times greater.
03 Act, s. 83, discussed, infra, Section 5.
04 Regulations, s. 18 (1) Cabinet approval is not required with respect to these
orders; notification of the Minister and a report to him are, however, required (s. 18(2)).
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B.

The Respective Roles of Government and Private Partiesin Gas Exports
All export sales of natural gas are effected through the contracts of
private parties, namely pipe line transmission companies, in the two countries,
rather than the efforts of government bodies. The role played by governments
is essentially one of approving or disapproving particular exports (or imports)
applied for by the parties.
This is not to say that the respective heads of governments play no part
in energy sales between the U.S. and Canada. Their role would appear to be
at a different level and most recently has involved the discussions between
the two governments concerning the sale of Canadian oil to the U.S. 65 The
governments reached an apparent agreement wherby oil sales would increase
over the next few years. Clearly, the N.E.B. played a role in these discussions,
and in fact, the Chairman attended the talks of the Prime Minister and President as an adviser.66 Similarly the Canadian government is directly involved
in discussions with U.S. oil companies and the U.S. government concerning
the proposed Trans-Alaska Pipe Line system and the Canadian-proposed
Mackenzie pipe line, to carry U.S. Alaskan oil to the U.S. markets. The
Chairman has been directly involved here as well, in an advisory capacity.
It is in discussions of this type that the expertise and advice of the Board
are particularly important.
An example of the dominating role of private parties in export transactions is provided by one case where the NEB declined to allocate markets
amongst gas producing areas. In 1965, Alberta and Southern applied to
increase its authorized export volume by 2 Tcf, involving the sale of gas
produced in Southwestern Alberta to the California market. 67 Westcoast
Transmission, which had been exporting gas only to the U.S. Pacific Northwest market intervened to claim a share of the California market for gas
produced in northern British Columbia and Alberta.
PG & E had already rejected Westcoast's proposal as uneconomic, since
the delivered gas price would be greater than that of Southern Alberta gas.
The Board summarized the issue as it was raised by Westcoast:
The principal reason for its intervention was to test whether it was in the national

interest of Canada for large new volumes of gas to be exported at a low price
and withdrawn from the area at present supplying all Canada east of the Rocky
65At the present time the U.S., through its Mandatory Oil Import Program has
imposed a quota on imports of Canadian crude oil. See "United States Oil Import
Restrictions: A Program in Need of Reform", (1970) 3 N.Y.UJ. Int. L & Politics
343; Plotnick, Petroleum: Canadian Markets and United States Foreign Trade Policy
(1964).
6611e Board as part of its advisory functions, Act, s. 22(2), is required, upon
request of the Minister, to recommend "the making of such arrangements as it considers desirable for co-operation with governmental or other agencies in or outside
Canada in respect of matters relating to energy and sources of energy."
67NEB, Report to the Governor in Council: In the Matter of the Application
under the National Energy Board Act of Alberta and Southern Gas Co. Ltd. et al, July,
1965. Hereinafter cited, "NEBReport (July, 1965)". Alberta and Southern buys gas in
Southwestern Alberta and sells it to the Pacific Gas and Electric project [hereinafter
referred to as "PG & E"l.
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Mountains while at the same time similar volumes of gas in northern British
Columbia, which were much more distant from these Canadian markets, were
to remain shut in ...
[rhe Board was requested to clearly state the gas policy for general use in
Canada. This need not necessarily involve dedication of markets but should
enable all the producing areas to share some measure of the available export
markets.68
The Board rejected the Westcoast proposal and approved the Alberta
and Southern export, but their analysis of the issues raised by the parties was
not satisfactory. Underlying the rejection seemed to be the fact that PG & E
had already refused the proposal by Westcoast and had stated they would
purchase gas from alternative U.S. sources.6 9 While the Board made no final
finding on the relative price of B.C. and Alberta gas, Westcoast submitted
data which were not objected to by other partied. The most favourable
result to Westcoast, comparing the rolled-in costs at the PG & E distribution
centre, Antioch, California, indicated that B.C. gas was approximately 10%
more costly than Alberta gas.70 But the Board apparently considered that
Canadian gas should be competitive with alternative U.S. sources 71 and
rejected the Westcoast intervention.
Most important, the Board declined to formulate any policy in respect
of market allocation, as requested by the parties:
The Board believes that it is neither practicable nor desirable to enunciate a
general policy regarding the "allocation" of markets in the sense proposed by
the intervenors ...It appears to the Board that to attempt to encourage development in one area of the country rather than another in spite of competitive
disadvantages, would be more likely in the long run to impair rather than to assist
the orderly and sound development of a gas industry in Canada capable of
competing not only in Canadian markets but in those United States markets to
which Canadian gas may penetrate. 72
It seems that the Board was willing to permit the export market and
private parties determine the pattern of development of Canadian gas resources. Implicit in the decision is a limited view of the Board's role in pro73
moting and affecting the development of gas resources.
C.

Export Application Procedure

The Board is empowered to make rules concerning the making of applications74 and the National Energy Board Rules of Practice and Procedure75
have been made pursuant to this power. The Rules specify the form of the
68Id., at 8-2-3.
69 Id., at 8-31, 8-32.
70 Id., at 8-14. The rolled-in cost lumps the costs of gas supplies and transmission
together to consider the cost to the final user, irrespective of the gas source.
71 Id., at 8-31. The Board's policy with respect to price has been modified substantially since this decision. See infra, Section 5. C.
72 Id., at 8-29 -30.
73 The decision never considered whether export should not be permitted at all, if
there was not sufficient benefit to Canada. This question is discussed infra, Section 5. A.
74
Act, s. 7(b).
75 Cited hereinafter as "NEB Rules".
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application76 and the information required for export applications is specified
by the Regulations.7' Export applications are usually coupled with an application for a certificate of public convenience and necessity to construct a
pipe line and further information is required in this respect.7 8 Multiple copies
of the application are submitted to the Board and are circulated amongst
the Board's staff for about two weeks for comments, following which the
Board meets with its staff to discuss deficiencies in the application. A "deficiency letter" is then sent to the applicant. Usually there are amendments
required in the application and it is understood that sometimes deficiency
comments will range outside the scope of the application, to include proposals not made by the applicant. In this sense the staff exerts limited influence
over the form of the application. Before setting the application down for hearing the Board may meet with the applicant to determine how the application
will be heard. 79 The application is then set down for hearing and the applicant
is notified by the Board Secretary of the time for the hearing and the applicant is notified by the Board secretary of the date of the hearing and the
method of notice.80 Notices are required to be published in specified newspapers at least four weeks before the hearing and specified notices are required to the Provinces, and interested parties. It is understood that the Board
notifies the Minister in advance of public announcement of the application,
for the purpose of keeping him advised with respect to questions in the House
of Commons.81
Applications are not public documents until the application has been
amended for deficiencies. It is submited that applications should be public
from the time of filing with the Secretary. There is no reason to allow an
applicant to air deficiencies privately. If information is missing then this can
be provided later and if the Board staff is influencing the course of the application, this should be done with public knowledge.
D. Intervenors
The Act is unclear in respect of the right of parties to intervene in export
application proceedings. There is specific provision in Part IH, in respect of
applications for certificates:
Upon an application for a certificate the Board shall consider the objections of
any interested person, and the decision of the Board as to whether a person
is
or is not an interested person for the purpose of this section is conclusive.8 2
76 NEB Rules, Rr. 4-7.
77

Regulations, s. 4. Applicants are required to submit detailed information of
the proposed export, markets, nature of gas purchase contracts, deliverability data,
evidence of satisfaction of provincial removal requirements, evidence that gas is surplus,
pipe line data, financial information on the pipe line system, etc.
78 Applications for certificates require further information specified in Part I, Schedule, NEB Rules. Included is detailed information on the route of the line.
79 NEB Rules, R. 13, provide for conferences before or during hearings.
80 NEB Rules, R. 6.
81

The relationship of the Board and Cabinet are discussed, infra, Section 6.
s. 45.

82 Act,
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However the Act is silent with respect to interventions in proceedings for
an export licence. 83 Even the right of "interested persons" in certificate proceedings is not wide since the Board is only required to "consider the objections" of the "interested Party" and the Board may decide who qualifies as
an "interested person". While the safeguards in the Act leave much to be
desired, the actual practice of the Board is another matter and will be considered here.
The importance of the role of third parties in proceedings before the
Board must be emphasized. While the framework in which exports are
authorized is the approval of private arrangements, clearly the Board was
established to consider the public interest in respect of such exports and
it is directed to consider matters beyond the immediate interests of the applicant.84 While applicants are required to present evidence with respect to satisfaction of export criteria (Canadian requirements, surplus, and trends in
discovery 8u) the matter is by no means one of ajudication of private rights.
Third parties may serve a most useful role in directing consideration of the
policy questions involved and challenging the policies of the Board.
The Board's practice since its first hearing has been to allow third parties
to participate in hearings. The writer is unaware of any case where the Board
refused to allow a third party to intervene, -and on the contrary, participation
in the hearings is encouraged. As discussed earlier, export applicants are
required to publish notices of the hearing in specific newspapers as well as
written notice to specified persons, usually the Provinces, and other companies involved. Certainly parties in the industry, including producers and
companies dealing with gas, will be aware of proceedings. However, it is
understood that the notice is not published in all newspapers in a city, and
that notice is sometimes carried for only a day. Some doubt must be expressed
about the effectiveness of the notification procedure for parties outside the
industry.
The procedure for intervention is in itself very simple, particularly because the document required to be filed by an intervenor before the hearing
need not be a complete statement of his case. This is important, since the
applicant may have spent several months in preparing his submission, while
the intervenor has less than four weeks to prepare a submission.8 6 As suggested earlier, it would seem useful, to the writer, to require notice of the
application immediately upon its receipt, rather than after the deficiency
letter procedure (which represents a delay of two to four weeks), to give
intervenors more time to prepare. Since the intervenor must file his submission in less than four weeks, these tend to be limited in scope to a statement
of the intention to oppose (or support) the application and general argu83 It should be pointed out that export applications are usually accompanied by a
certificate application, since new facilities are often required for an increased export
by an existing pipe line, and certainly required for a new system.
84 The criteria and factors involved are discussed, supra, Sections 5. B and 5. C.
85 Regulations, s. 4(2) (j). This is copied from the test in Act, s. 83(a), discussed,

Infra.

8ONEB Rules, R. 7. Intervenors must file a reply or submission with the Board
Secretary, within the time allotted in the public notice. This will be less than 4 weeks,
since the Board usually requires the notice 4 weeks before the hearing.
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ments that will be offered. It is understood that most of the preparation takes
place during the hearing of the applicant's direct case and in the adjournment
that follows before hearing interventions.
The role that intervenors have played in past has varied considerably and
will be considered here briefly. There are several classes of intervenors representing various interests:
(1) Gas Producers. The producers are usually supporting the export application, as would be expected, since they seek to maximize their production.
Typically they will support a particular pipe line company with which they
have contracted to sell gas for export. Probably one of the most active intervenors was associated with the Westcoast attempt to gain a share of the
California gas market, for the northern British Columbia producing area,
in 1965. 87
(2) Provinces. The stance of individual provinces varies. Typically, the
producing provinces support applications. In Alberta's case the removal from
the Province will have been approved and thus the Province is in the position
of supporting the O.G.C.B. decision. The consuming Provinces, are typically
interested in assuring the availability of adequate supplies of favourably
priced gas and hence may seek to reduce the volume of export.
(3) Transmission Companies. These companies, which operate the pipe
lines, are usually the applicants for export licences, and they may intervene
in the applications of competing companies. An excellent example is the
continuing conflict between Trans-Canada Pipe Line and Northern Natural
Gas. Northern Natural serves the Minneapolis-Wisconsin gas market in the
U.S. and has since the development of the Trans-Canada system competed
for access to Canadian gas supplies. In 1966, Northern intervened to oppose
the proposed Great Lake Pipe Line System, which passed through their
market area and proposed instead a displacement scheme.88 At the NEB
hearings, Northern Natural sought to have the Board delete a proposed
condition of the export-import licence, requiring the gas exported at Emerson,
Manitoba to be re-imported.89 However the Board ruled during the hearing
that it was "not prepared to issue a licence as unconditioned as is proposed
by the Northern Companies '"90 and that in the event of approval of the
scheme by the NEB, but FPC preference for the Northern project, then
a new hearing would be required. The Board refused to hear evidence concerning the Northern project, since this would be irrelevant to the application.9 ' Thus Northern was prevented from using the intervention as a backdoor way to apply for a licence, when they did not have any Canadian or
8

7 See
88

discussion, supra, Section 3. B.
Discussed, supra, Section 2. They also apposed the Great Lakes project before
the FPC. See Re Great Lakes Gas Transmission Company, Opinion No. 521, (1967)
69 P.U.R. 3d 497; reheard, Opinion No. 521-A, (1967) P.U.R. 3d 519 (FPC).
89
National Energy Board, Report to the Governor in Council: In the Matter of
the Application under the National Energy Board Act of Trans-Canada Pipe Lines
Limited to TransportNatural Gas to Central Ontario via the United States of America,
August 1966. [Hereinfater cited, "NEB Report (August 1966)".]
901d., at 3-11.
91 Id., at 3-10 -11.
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American contracts to support an application. 92 They were still permitted
"to participate if cross-examination and argument are kept relevant to the
issues now before the Board, 93 but the Board did not state in what sense
Northern was an interested person. This decision is significant in that it seems
clear that the Board will allow American parties to intervene94 to discuss the
Canadian public interest issues and in doing so a very broad interpretation
is given to "interested persons" who may appear.
(4) Distribution Companies and Utilities. There is an obvious interest here
in the protection of supplies for Canadian consumer markets as well as protecting the price of Canadian gas. Thus these parties will seek to increase
the protection of Canadian requirements so as to reduce the surplus available
for export."5
(5) Other Parties. Outside of the parties discussed above, very few interventions have been made. In the Great Lakes case, discussed elsewhere, a joint
intervention was filed by the Fuels Research Council, National Coal Association and the United Mine Workers of America, in opposition to the project,
to protect their interest in the U.S. coal industry. 96 In the same hearing a
major intervention was entered by the Fort William-Port Arthur and District
Labour Council and Local 628, United Association of Journeyman Plumbers
and Apprentices of the United States and Canada. 97 This group opposed the
looping of the Trans-Canada line through the U.S. and sought to have the
line built through northern Ontario instead, parallel to the existing line, to
secure the benefits of construction to that area, rather than to the U.S. ' 8
To the writer's knowledge, this was the most active intervention ever conducted in a proceeding before the Board by a private party outside the industry, and the intervention contributed substantially to the broad policy
discussions carried out before the Board.
Clearly absent from past interventions have been public interest groups, 9
seeking to participate in the discussion concerning the policy concerning
natural gas export and to oppose or support export proposals. All the groups
discussed above have a financial interest in the outcome of the application.
02 This objection was apparently not raised in the Westcoast intervention in the
Alberta and Southern application for export to California, discussed infra, Section 4. B,
(NED Report (July, 1965), which was similarly an attempt to apply for an export
indirectly when Westcoast did not have any export contracts to support an application.
O8NEB Report (August, 1966), at 3-12.

04
1n the same hearing the Board permitted a joint intervention by the Fuels
Research Council Inc., National Coal Association, and the United Mine Workers, NEB
Report (August, 1966), at 3-12. The sole interest of these parties was in the U.S. coal
industry, and thus sought a high export price for Canadian gas and argued that injury
to the U.S. coal industry would be detrimental to the Canadian public interest. Unfortunately the Board did not respond to the latter argument.

05The most obvious recent example is the intervention of Ontario Hydro in the
August, 1970 decision of the Board, supra, in which Ontario Hydro sought, successfully, to reduce the volume of gas exported, to protect gas supplies for its own use.
(0See f.n. 94.
07NEB Report (August, 1966), at 3-13 if.
98The case is discussed, infra, Section 5. B.
99Since the writing of this paper, Pollution Probe of University of Toronto and
the N.D.P. Waffle Group have appeared before the Board at an export hearing which

commenced in July, 1971.
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While the representation of provincial governments, particularly Ontario,
comes closest to performing this function, it is the writer's understanding that
such interventions have been narrower in scope and confined to the details
of particular proposals. It is suggested that if the Board is to fulfill its function, then hearings should be concerned with the broad implications of gas
export and its benefit to Canada.
While it is clear that public discussion of export policy is important in
the process of formulating these policies, it is not clear how it can be accomplished. The hearings before the Board, are very long (the most recent lasted
54 days) and parties with a financial interest in the outcome will invest a
substantial amount of money in preparing for and participating in the hearing.
It is understood from discussion with the Board Chairman that any interested
party, (such as a pollution group, political organization, or citizen's group)
could make a submission to the Board, but in order to influence the Board,
the party should present testimony and hence be open to challenge by other
parties.1 00 It is also understood that applicants before the Board object to the
admission as evidence of such interested statements and opinions. Thus we
are left with a dilemma. A well-prepared intervention before the Board, supported by expert testimony and represented by experienced counsel would be
very costly and probably impossible, as a result, to such parties. Thus, discussion of many issues will be left to the participation of provincial governments and the conduct of the hearing by the Board. Certainly this is a weakness of the system chosen to protect the Canadian public interest.
E. Hearings
There is no express requirement in the Act that the Board hold a hearing
in respect of the issue of either a certificate of public convenience and necessity or an export licence. However, a hearing is specifically required with
respect to the revocation or suspension of a certificate or licence 1 and if a
hearing is held for the issue, revocation, or suspension of a licence, it must
be held in public. 0 2 It would be academic, however, to consider whether
hearings are required
in respect of export licences, since the Board does in
03
fact hold hearings.
A serious question arises concerning what evidence the Board may act
on. The concern is not with respect to the exclusionary rules of evidence or
100The Board draws a distinction between submissions and interventions, NEB
Report (August, 1970), at 2-1:
...an intervention is a document filed as an exhibit at the hearing that was supported by testimony or argument and that was consequently open to cross-examination or rebuttal. A submission is an expression of opinion or a statement of
fact that was submitted to the Board which, while it may have been filed as an
exhibit, was not supported by testimony and hence was not subject to crossexamination.
101Act, s. 47 (certificates), s. 84 (licences).
02
Id., s. 20(1).
1 3
0 1t should be noted, however, that hearings are not held in respect of orders
authorizing exports. See supra, Section 3. A, for a discussion of exports by order.
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the sufficiency of the evidence, 10 but evidence which is not introduced at the
hearing and hence not on the record.
On the basis of certain decisions of the Board, it would seem that its
findings are not always based on evidence on the record. In the Great Lakes
case' 0 5 one of the main issues was the economics of the Trans-Canada proposal for a pipe line south of the Great Lakes, through the U.S. relative to a
route through Northern Ontario, parallel to the existing pipe line. At the
hearing Trans-Canada presented evidence demonstrating that the Great Lakes
line would substantially decrease transmission costs (relative to a Northern
Ontario line), but the Board Staff carried out its own study and concluded
that after five years of operation the transmission costs of the two systems
would be almost the same. 10 6 The study made by the Board Staff was not on
the record and not presented at the hearing. While the Board approved
Trans-Canada's application, it expressed serious doubts about the project in
its Report and the proposal was
initially rejected by the Cabinet, apparently
07
largely because of this factor.
In the most recent export application proceeding, 108 the Board included
in its finding of Canadian gas requirements an amount for the Hearn thermalelectric generating station in Toronto which is converting from coal to natural
gas as a fuel supply. This finding was based on evidence not on the record
and Ontario Hydro-Electric did not approach the Board until after the hearing. 0 9 It would seem to the writer that this could have a substantial influence
on the bargaining position of Trans-Canada with the distributor, Consumers'
Gas, and Ontario Hydro, since Trans-Canada would apparently not know
what volume of gas supply was involved. 110 This is not to criticize the Board
decision to set aside this gas for Canadian use but rather to question whether
the practice of considering such matters out of the hearing is appropriate. It
is apparent from comments by the Minister of Mines and Minerals that
Alberta"' may have objected to the decision to set this gas aside and this
should have been brought out at the Hearing.
While the Board is directed to hold all hearings in public, 1 2 they are
also directed to "have regard to all considerations that appear to it to be
104 See Carter, 'The National Energy Board of Canada and the American Administrative Procedure Act - A Comparative Study," (1969), 34 Sask. L. Rev. 104, at
123-27, where it is concluded that the Board is not bound by the exclusionary rules of
evidence and courts will not consider the sufficiency evidence on which the Board bases
these decisions.
105 NEB Report (August, 1966).
100 Id., at 5-20 -38.
107 See discussion, infra, Section 5. C.
108 NEB Report (August, 1970).
100 Id., at 3-7, 3-15, 10-9.
110 In its decision the Board commented on the contracting practices of the utility
companies, and said that there was an obligation on the distribution utilities to ensure
adequate protection of their future requirements. NEB Report (August, 1970).
111 Globe and Mail, October 15, 1970, at B3. The Minister is quoted as objecting
to the Board's decision, no doubt because, in part, it resulted in part in the rejection of
the Consolidated Natural Gas application to build a new export pipe line, since the
Board determined that there was not an exportable surplus of gas sufficient to support
that project.
112 ACt, s. 20(1).
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relevant."' 13 Since the Board functions as an administrative body, taking into
account public policy, they can look to public policy considerations not on the
record. 1" 4 Certainly it would seem preferable for these matters to be discussed
at the hearing, and then be disposed of by the Board on their merits in order
to permit public discussion of the issues.
F. Post-Hearing Proceedings
After the hearing, the Board together with its Staff considers the application; the time required to reach a decision is typically several months.
While there is no statutory requirement to give a reasoned decision the Board
in fact does so in all cases. The decision appears in the form of a "Report to
the Governor in Council", since Cabinet approval is necessary in respect of
all certificates" 5 and export licences." 6 Furthermore the report is not published until after the Cabinet has disposed of it, although the Report is published even if the Cabinet refuses to approve it."1
A right of appeal is provided:
18. (1) An appeal lies from a decision or order of the Board to the Federal
Court of Appeal upon a question of law or a question of jurisdiction, upon leave
therefor being obtained from that Court upon application made within one month
after the making of the decision or order sought to be appealed from or within
such further time as that Court or a judge thereof under special circumstances
allows.
(2) No appeal lies after leave therefor has been obtained under subsection
within sixty days from
(1) unless it is entered in the Federal Court of Appeal
the making of the order granting leave to appeal."" 8

There have been only two appeals from NEB decisions. One involved
the jurisdiction of the Board to award compensation for interference with
mineral rights by a pipe line 1 9 and is of no interest here. The other concerned a certificate issued by the Board for a pipe line carrying American oil
through Canada and back to the U.S.120 However the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal,' 2 ' on the question of whether the Board erred in law in

determining on the facts that the proposed line "is and will be required by
the present and future public convenience and necessity."'122 Since the appeal
was dismissed with no written reasons, we are left with no judicial comment on the scope of judicial review of the Board's decision with respect to

exports.
I's Id., s. 83.

114 See eg., Re Cloverdale Shopping Centre Ltd. [1966] 2 O.R. 439.
115 Act, ss. 44. The role of the Cabinet is considered, infra, Section 6.
116 Regulations, s. 8.
"7 The Great Lakes application is the only case where the Cabinet refused to
approve the Board's decision. This was subsequently approved with modification to the
scheme. See infra, Sections 5. C., 6.
11 Act, ss. 18-19. See Carter, op. cit., at 131-9, for a discussion of the right of
appeal from NEB decisions.
119 Act, s. 74. Crow's Nest Pass Coal Co. v. Alberta Natural Gas Company [1963]
S.C.R.2 257.
1 0 NEB, Report of the Governor in Council: In the Matter of Matador Pipe Line,
July, 1961.
121 Great Northern Pipe Line Company v. Matador Pipe Line Company, Supreme
Court of Canada, Nov. 28, 1961. Unreported.
122 Act, s. 44.
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5. GAS EXPORT POLICY
A.

The Formulation of a Gas Export Policy
One of the reasons for the establishment of the Board was to formulate
a national policy with respect to gas export. In this section some of the considerations involved in this question will be discussed.
Natural gas, and all petroleum resources, are depleting and non-renewable resources and there is clearly an upper limit on the extent of these
resources. It is assumed that the underlying policy objective should be to
maximize the benefit to Canada from the development and use of these resources. This involves a consideration of whether the resources should be
developed and used; if so, when, keeping in mind the long term interests of
Canada; and finally, how the resource should be used, which includes a decision as to whether they should be used outside the country. The approach
taken is to look at the benefits and costs to Canada as a whole from the
development of the resource, and the main question considered is whether
gas should be exported at all.
(1) Benefits from Development and Export
The most obvious benefits accrue from the sale of the resource by their
owner. Most Canadian production of natural gas comes from Alberta, produced from gas reserves on Crown lands. There are substantial potential
reserves in lands under Federal jurisdiction, especially the Arctic as well as
in lands off the East coast, under ownership of the maritime provinces and
the Federal government. Thus the respective governments receive a direct
1 23
benefit from the sale of the resources to private parties who develop them.
There is also a revenue benefit from taxation of the profits of the companies
involved in the industry. A further benefit from exports arises from contribution to balancing the balance of payments with the U.S. The development and
exploration activities represent a major input to the economy of the producing provinces, and particularly Alberta.1 4
It is arguable that the export market for the resource encourages development and hence underwrites the cost of development while protecting the
availability of the resource for Canadians. This however assumes that present
development of the resource is a desired goal, while it might be argued that
it would be best to defer development until the future.
Substantial benefits are associated with the transmission pipe lines. The
construction of pipe lines represents a major economic activity with direct
benefits from employment of construction and operation personnel, 25 and
123 During the 23 year period ending in 1969, the governments of the four western
provinces collected revenues totalling $3.5 billion from the lease of oil rights. Gray,
supra at 10. In 1970 the total revenues to the Alberta Government from exploration
and development of gas reserves on Crown land was $218,215,983. Alberta, Department
of Mines and Minerals, Alberta Oil and Gas Picture 1947-1969 and 1970 (1970). This
constitutes approximately 20 - 25% of Alberta's Provincial Revenues.
124 See Weinrich, Economic Impact of the Canadian Gas Industry - Local, Provincial and Regional, (Calgary Chamber of Commerce, September 1966).
125 It might be argued conversely that this is of little or no benefit since construction employment is temporary and causes regional dislocations of the labour force.

1971]

OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL

purchase of capital equipment (pipelines, compressors, etc.) to the extent
that this occurs in Canada. There are also economic multiplier effects resulting
from the construction of pipe lines, in the manufacturing sector. An important
benefit from exports has been to the Trans-Canada line and thus benefit
Eastern Canadian markets.
It is also arguable that since it is likely that there will be major innovations in the energy industries in the next 20 to 30 years, that there is no point
in "sitting on resources" and we should sell them now. This assumes that
there is a present benefit from export of the resource and that there will be
no benefit from its future development. The development of alternative energy
sources, however, is a contingency which may not be realized in the near
future, as evidenced by the problems encountered in the development of
atomic energy for power generation. Furthermore, the NEB forecasts that
120
natural gas will increase in importance as a source of energy in Canada.
Thus it might be in Canada's interests to defer development of the resource
to protect future needs.
An important benefit, which is often ignored, is the effect of development
of gas resources on the development of the petrochemical industry. While
natural gas is important as a form of energy, it is the by-products from the
processing of the gas near the producing area, before the gas is sent to the
consumption markets, which are used in the petrochemical industry. On this
basis, Alberta has developed an important petrochemical industry, due in
part to the availability of an export market for the processed natural gas.
There is also a substantial input to the economy from investment in
the petroleum industry, in exploration, development, and marketing. However
this may not be a benefit, but a diversion of the investment of scarce financial
capital away from other activities.
(2) Costs of Development
The strongest argument offered against the development of the resource
for export is that it is not in Canada's interest to continue as a primary
resource-based economy. Thus, it is argued, the resources should be used
domestically as the basis of a strong secondary industry economy, since
energy is of fundamental importance to such an economy.
A further cost is the extent to which commitments are made to continue
supply of gas once the American market is supplied with gas. Thus, it might
be argued that once the flow of gas is started it cannot be turned off at will,
since commitments are for a long term (15 to 25 years). Furthermore once
a pipe line is connected to an American market, that line effectively represents
a permanent
drain on Canadian reserves, and renewal of exports will be
27
assured.1
126 See NEB, Energy Supply and Demand and Export Demand for Canadian Energy

1966 to 1990 (1969).
327tIt is interesting to note that while Canadian gas supplies represent only 3% of
the total gas demands of the U.S. at this time, the NEB forecasts that this will increase
to 15% by 1990.
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There is also the risk that by becoming tied to supplying the U.S. energy
market, the price for Canadian gas will be a reflection of the American price.
This may mean an inadequate price for Canadian gas, as was the case in the
Westcoast export. The presence of major American gas pipe lines in the
market for Canadian-produced gas might result in a price increase to Canadian consumers, due to the increased demand. Against this proposition, it is
argued that without the export market, gas prices will rise because of reduced
incentive for exploration and hence the supply will decrease.
The end use of the gas should also be considered. Thus, it should be
asked whether the activity using this energy is in Canada's long-run interests.
This of course raises fundamental questions about our social goals and the
society we live in and also forces us to consider whether the use being made
of the gas in the export market is in Canada's best interests. This includes
examination of the spill-over effects (such as environmental pollution) of the
industries using the gas, both in Canada and the U.S. It might be argued that
by continuing to supply gas to these industries an opportunity is lost to change
the nature of that activity. Closely related is the ecological damage resulting
from the development of the gas reserves such as the damage to the countryside, and interference from pipe line construction and operation.
The nature of the gas producing industry must be considered. Like the
petroleum industry in general, it is almost wholly foreign-owned. Thus part of
the profits realized from production are lost to Canada. More important, the
decisions concerning development of the resources are made outside the
country. The same is true of a market which is largely export-oriented since
it is this market which largely determines the pattern of development of the
producing areas.
(3)

Conclusions
It is not possible to offer a simple yes or no answer to the question of
whether Canada should continue to export natural gas. While a number of
factors have been offered for consideration, they do not lead to any final
determination of the question. Certainly at a high enough price, export may
be in Canada's interest. However because of the uncertainties and unquantifiable factors involved it is not possible to determine this level. Furthermore
it would seem that a long term commitment to export markets is undesirable,
because of the risks and uncertainties involved. Perhaps exports can be justified if the terms are favourable to Canada, meaning a good price and a short
term commitment. However, the factors weighing against this argument are
formidable and a large question mark remains.
B.

The Gas Export Policy of the National Energy Board Act
Although the apparent intention of the National Energy Board Act and
the reason for the establishment of the Board is to maximize the benefit to
Canada from the country's energy resources, there is no statement of this
purpose in the Act, which contains no preamble, and in fact the statutory
direction to the Board is in much narrower terms. The regulatory control of
the Board is contained in Part VI of the Act:
81. Except as provided in the regulations, no person shall export any gas or
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power or import any gas except under the authority of and in accordance with
a licence issued under this Part.
82. (1) Subject to the regulations, the Board may issue licences, upon such terms
and conditions as are prescribed by the regulations,
(a) for the exportation of power or gas, and
(b) for the importation of gas.
(2) A licence issued under this Part may be restricted or limited as to area,
quantity or time or as to class or kind of products.
(3) Every licence is subject to the condition that the provisions of this Act and
the regulations in force at the date of issue thereof and as subsequently enacted,
made or amended, as well as every order made under the authority of this Act,
will be complied with.
83. Upon an application for a licence the Board shall have regard to all considerations that appear to it to be relevant and, without limiting the generality of
the foregoing, the Board shall satisfy itself that
(a) the quantity of gas or power to be exported does not exceed the surplus
remaining after due allowance has been made for the reasonably foreseeable
requirements for use in Canada having regard in the case of an application to
export gas to the trends in the discovery of gas in Canada; and
(b) the price to be charged by an applicant for gas or power exported by him
is just and reasonable in relation to the public interest.

There is a general prohibition on all exports of gas which may be authorized only by export licence. 128 Section 83 contains the consideration which the
Board is required to take into account in making a determination of the surplus of gas and that the price is "just and reasonable in relation to the public
interest". The introductory words of the section are vague ("all considerations
that appear to it to be relevant") and provide little direction other than to
permit the Board to introduce any factors it wishes. Of course it may also
be used by applicants and intervenors to introduce various arguments, but it is
up to the Board to decide their relevancy. 2 9 The surplus requirement is narrow, but the Board has concentrated on this consideration in all its decisions,
as will be seen from the discussion in the next section.

The price consideration is potentially the broadest direction to the Board.
Strangely, the "public interest" requirement, in relation to a "just and reasonable" price is the only mention of the public interest in respect of export
licences. There is no mention of the public interest in relation to the quantity

of gas to be exported, the term of the export, or indeed whether gas should
be exported at all, having regard to the objective of maximizing resource
128 Exports may also be authorized by order. This is discussed, supra.
12 9
For example in the Great Lakes case, NEB Report (August, 1966), Northern
Natural, in its intervention, attempted to convince the Board to consider the merits of
a displacement scheme, whereby Western Canadian gas would be sold to the Western
U.S. markets in exchange for the sale of U.S. gas into the Eastern Canadian market,
rather than the system proposed by Trans-Canada whereby Western Canadian gas
would be carried to the Eastern Canadian markets, with no connection to U.S. gas
supplies. By deciding not to hear evidence on the proposal (on the ground that there
was no specific application for such a proposal and the evidence was irrelevant) the
Board refused to consider the merits of such a scheme to Canada. It is suggested that
the Board should have considered this question and reviewed the original Canadian
policy, enunciated by C.D. Howe in the 1950's, that Eastern Canadian markets should
be supplied by Canadian gas, against the energy picture at the time. Instead, the Board
in effect deferred to this government policy without a consideration of its merits in the
contemporary setting.
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benefit to Canada. It is suggested that a broad reading of s.83 (b) could lead
to such an analysis, since the Board could determine, on a benefit-cost analysis, that the "just and reasonable" price would be so high that there would
be no export market. In fact the Board has not taken such an approach and
has limited its decisions to an analysis of the cost of transmission, and the
Canadian and American energy market prices.' 30 This is discussed in the next
section.
Other considerations are introduced by Part M of the Act, which requires a certificate of public convenience and necessity issued by the Board
to operate a pipeline.' 31 The criteria to be considered by the Board in respect
of issuing a certificate are much broader than the export licence provisions:
The Board may, subject to the approval of the Governor in Council, issue a
certificate in respect of a pipe line or an international power line if the Board is

satisfied that the line is and will be required by the present and future public

convenience and necessity, and, in considering an application for a certificate,
the Board shall take into account all such matters as to it appear to be relevant,
and without limiting the generality of the foregoing, the Board may have regard

to the following:

(a) the availability of oil or gas to the pipe line, or power to the international
power line, as the case may be;
(b) the existence of markets, actual or potential;
(c) the economic feasibility of the pipe line or international power line;
150The Act does not give the Board power to regulate the well-head price of gas,
and the price considered by the Board is that at which the gas is sold to the U.S.
transmission company at the border (the "border price"). In its first decision, NEB,
Report to the Governor in Council: In the Matter of the Application under the National
Energy Board Act of Trans-Canada Pipe Lines Ltd., et al., March, 1960, at 11-27.

Hereinafter, "NEB Report" (March, 1960), the Board considered its jurisdiction over
well-head prices and decided that there is nothing in the Act giving the Board such
jurisdiction and commented that approval of an expert did not constitute approval of gas
purchase contracts. Subsequent decisions of the Board, particularly with respect to escala-

tion clauses have certainly affected the price of gas at the well-head. By contrast the
FPC has jurisdiction over the well-head price of gas under the Natural Gas Act, 1938,

15 U.S.C.A. 717 ff. as a result of the U.S. Supreme Court decision in Phillips Petroleum Company v. State of Wisconsin (1954), 3 P.U.R. 3d 129. See generally, Saucier,

"Legal Problems Involved in the Transmission, Distribution, and Pricing of Natural Gas
in Canada" [1960] Can. Bar Papers 298, for a discussion or regulation of the natural gas

producer.

131 Act, s. 26 (1) (a). The Act also retains indirect control over the persons ope-

rating pipe lines since only a "company" is defined, s. 2(c) as a "person having autho-

rity under a Special Act to construct or operate pipe lines." While this was an important
control prior to the establishment of the Board, and in fact led to many stormy debates
in the House of Commons (in particular the Great Pipe Line Debate of 1956), the
control would seem to be of very little significance today. It might be argued that the
introduction of the Board, which had the effect of removing all these considerations
from Parliament, was an attempt by the Government to avoid the difficult questions
posed by export of natural gas, and in particular the controversial public debates. One
example of a control exercised by Parliament over a pipe line is the Act incorporating
Trans-Canada Pipe Lines, S.C. 1950-51, s. 92, as amended, S.C. 1953-54, c. 80, s. 6(a),
providing that the Company may "within or outside Canada construct ... pipe lines ...
provided that the main pipe line or lines shall be located entirely within Canada," an
expression of the national policy about pipe line stated by C. D. Howe. The provision
was raised by opponents of the Great Lakes project as preventing Trans-Canada from
using the proposed line to be located in the U.S. for supply of Eastern Canada, but
rejected by the Board.
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(d) the financial responsibility and financial structure of the applicant, the
methods of financing the line and the extent to which Canadians will have an
opportunity of participating in the financing, engineering and construction of
the line; and
opinion may be affected by the granting
(e) any public interest that in the Board's
132
or the refusing of the application.

Since major export applications always involve the construction of
new facilities, an export licence application will usually be joined with an
application for a certificate and accordingly these provisions must be considered. It is suggested that the requirement of "present and future public
convenience and necessity", which is reinforced by the requirement that the
"line is and will be required .. ." is broad enough to encompass the widest
analysis of the benefits and costs to Canada of export of natural gas, especially
1
when combined with the specific requirements as to availability of gas as
and the public interest requirement.1a 4 However, the Board has not taken
such a wide approach in applying section 44, and it tends to look to the
specific requirements of the subsections in a limited way.as5
Further standards may be found in Part II of the Act in which the advisory functions of the Board are set out:
22. (1) The Board shall study and keep under review matters over which the
Parliament of Canada has jurisdiction relating to the exploration for, production,
recovery, manufacture, processing, transmission, transportation, distribution, sale,
purchase, exchange, and disposal of energy and sources of energy within and
outside of Canada, shall report thereon from time to time to the Minister and
shall recommend to the Minister such measures within the jurisdiction of the
Parliament of Canada as it considers necessary or advisable in the public interest
for the control, supervision, conservation, use, marketing and development of
energy and sources of energy.
(2) The Board shall, at the request of the Minister, prepare studies and reports
on any matter relating to energy or sources of energy, and shall recommend to
the Minister for co-operation with governmental or other agencies in or outside
Canada in respect of matters relating to energy and sources of energy.la6

While this does not relate directly to the disposition of particular applications
by the Board it would certainly seem to require the Board to comment on
the public interest implications of export schemes, even if not publicly, and
the Board is charged with recommending policies to the Minister. Similarly
132

Act, s.44.

1831d., s. 44(a).

134 Id., s. 44(c).

135 The Board has however considered the benefits of scale from the operation
of a pipe line which serves both domestic and export markets. In the Westcoast case,
NEB, Reason for Decision: In the Matter of the Application under the National Energy
Board Act of Westcoast Transmission Company Limited, December, 1967 [hereinafter,
'"EB Report (December, 1967)"], the Board did consider that while the export markets
had contributed to Canadian benefit by making the line economically feasible, this was
no longer the case since gas was being exported at a very low price and there was no
longer a benefit from the operation of the line. In the most recent decision, NEB Report
(August, 1970), the Board turned down the application of Consolidated Natural Gas to
export natural gas by a wholly export-oriented pipe line since there would be no benefits
of the economies of scale of the operation of a large pipe line according to Canadian
consumers.
136
Act, ss.22(1), (2).
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the provision in s.22(2) would require the Board to consider the arrangements Canada has with the U.S. in respect of trade in energy, 8 7 and evaluate
whether the present framework for sale of natural gas is desirable.38
In the general jurisdiction section granting powers to the Board there
is a very wide hearing power:
11. The Board has full and exclusive jurisdiction to inquire into, hear and determine any matter
(b) where it appears to the Board that the circumstances may require the Board,
in the public interest, to make any order or give any direction, leave, sanction
or approval that by law it is authorized to make or give, or with respect to any
matter, act or thing that by this Act or any such regulation, certificate, licence,
permit, order or direction is prohibited, sanctioned or required to be done.18 9

This would authorize the Board to conduct the widest possible public hearing
to determine matters in the public interest. 40
Thus, in conclusion, there are potentially very wide criteria provided
in the Act which would require the Board to consider the benefit and cost to
Canada of natural gas export (and development in general). The writer
expresses his apprehension however about the drafting of s.83, which sets
out the criteria to be considered by the Board in disposing of an export application, since it seems to contemplate only limited consideration by the Board
of the public interest.
C.

An Analysis of the Decisions of the National Energy Board
In this section some of the factors considered by the Board will be
discussed and related to the earlier discussion of the benefits and costs to
Canada of exporting natural gas. The comments are based on the Reports of
the Board to the Governor in Council which include lengthy discussions of
the considerations taken into account by the Board. The most comprehensive
187 Since the "request of the Minister" relates only to studies and reports, the writer
concludes that there is a continuing obligation on the Board to make recommendations
concerning arrangements with other governments.
18The Board apparently played an important role in the discussions between
Canada and the U.S. with respect to the sale of crude oil. The private contract system
of trade in natural gas is discussed, supra, Section 5. C.
180 Act, s. I1(b).

140 However in its most recent decision, NEB Report (August, 1970), at 10-7,
the Board rejected the idea of holding regular special hearings to consider Canadian
requirements for natural gas:
The relative frequency of hearings on export licence applications and on domestic
certificates applications, along with the Board's own activity in market surveillance
and forecasting, which bring the Board into constant contact with industry thinking, appear to afford adequate opportunity for interest parties and for the Board
to review future Canadian requirements.
In contrast, the Alberta Oil and Gas Conservation Board recently decided to hold special
requirements hearings every three years, although it concluded that reserve hearings
were not required. Alberta, Oil and Gas Conservation Board, Report and Decision of
Policies and Proceduresunder the Gas Resources PreservationAct, 1956, October, 1969.

(OGCB Report 69-D). The writer has already expressed doubts about whether the
export licence hearings provide a forum for interested parties, without a financial interest
in the outcome of the decision, to express their views on the export policies of the
Board. Perhaps a hearing of the type suggested would fulfill such a need and could be
broadened to consider all the policy questions involved.
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recent discussion of policies is found in the August, 1970 decision of the
Board, 41 authorizing the export of 6.3 Tcf of natural gas by four projects.
The Board has not published any comprehensive review of its policies and
criteria in respect of natural gas export, although it is suggested that this may
be done in the future. 142 The Federal Government is also making a comprehensive review of natural resource policy which may result in the production of two white papers, on minerals policy and energy policy,14 which
will certainly influence the discussions between Canada and the U.S. concerning energy trade. A review and re-appraisal of Canadian energy policy,
particularly with respect to exports would be most constructive at this time.
(1)

Gas Export Policy
The most disappointing aspect of the Board's decisions to date, in the
writer's opinion, has been the limited nature of the discussion of the Board's
policies in respect of the export of natural gas, in the context of an analysis
of the benefits and costs to Canada of exporting gas. For the most part the
decisions dwell on the mechanics of surplus determination evaluation of border
prices, and the feasibility of the pipe lines, without coming to grips with the
broader policy questions. Part of the problem is, no doubt, the pressure on
the Board to reach decisions and dispose of applications in minimal time.
Certainly the delay involved is substantial. In the most recent case, TransCanada filed its application in June, 1969, hearings were held from November, 1969 to March, 1970, the Board submitted its Report to the Cabinet in
August, 1970 and licences were issued on September 29, 1970.144 While
this delay, in fact the entire proceeding, is expensive for the parties involved,
it would likely impair the effectivness of the decision-making if the Board
were to give in to pressures to reach early decisions.
In its first decision, in March, 1960,145 the Board undertook virtually

no analysis of the policy considerations and went through the mechanical
calculation of the surplus available for export. Although the Borden Com141 NEB Report (August, 1970).
142 Id., Foreword, p. iii.
143 Crane, "Review of National Resources Policy May Produce 2 White Papers,"
Globe and Mail, February 2, 1971, at Bi.
' 44

The writer was surprised to discover that the Board issued a certificate to Trans-

Canada, in June, 1970, for the construction of the necessary pipe line facilities, before
the final disposition of the export application. NEB, Interim Report to the Governor in
Council: In the Matter of the Application under the National Energy Board Act of
Trans-CanadaPipe Lines to Construct and Operate Certain Additional Pipe Line Faci-

lities, June, 1970. Trans-Canada had commitments to U.S. customers starting in November, 1970 and it requested the early disposition to enable construction of the facilities

in time to meet its commitments. The Board reasoned that if the construction was not

completed in time, that: (at 7)
... Trans-Canada would suffer a loss of revenue and there would be inconvenience, and possibly unnecessary hardship, to United States users of gas who are
dependent on increased supplies from Trans-Canada.
Apparently the certificate was issued with the understanding that Trans-Canada was
proceeding at its own risk in the event that the export was not approved, and there were
no interventions opposing the disposition.
'45 NEB Report (March, 1960).
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mission had considered the question140 and there had been extensive debates
in the House of Commons, it would have been useful for the Board to open
its first decision with a statement of the principles involved. Indeed, the
Report lacks even an analysis of the statutory provisions.
Subsequent decisions have elaborated on various policies, mostly concerned with surplus calculation and the price of exports, but have not examined the export policy question in depth. Thus in the August, 1970 decision
the Board commences Chapter 10 of the Report with a statement of "the
basic policy of Canada in respect to exportation of natural gas":
The basic concept is clear and simple. Natural gas may be exported if the Board,
having satisfied itself that the gas is surplus to Canadian requirements and that the
price is just and reasonable in relation to the public interest, and having regard
is prepared to issue a licence
to all considerations that appear to it to be relevant, 47
and the Governor in Council approves the licenee.1

The concept is not "clear and simple". However this represents a policy
which has been consistently followed by Canada since the early 1950's,
namely that all "surplus natural gas" may be exported. There has also been
an underlying policy favouring the winning of a share of the U.S. gas market
for Canada. Until recent years, there was only a limited market for Canadian
gas since U.S. gas was cheaper and the FPC opposed dependance on Canadian supplies. However, the drastic change in the U.S. energy supply situation has altered that and there appears to be a major market available for
Canada. 48 Far from opposing the sale of gas to the U.S. outright, the writer
considers that Canada may be able to benefit from the U.S. situation, but it is
imperative that there be an understanding of the implications of selling gas to
the U.S.
It has been suggested earlier in this paper that one of the considerations
which has been relevant in the Board's decisions is the benefit from economies
of scale accruing to Canadians from the operation of a pipe line serving both
domestic and export markets. The Westcoast and Trans-Canada pipe lines
are both examples of this.
In both cases the export component has contributed to the cost of operation of the line and hence Canadian consumers in Southern British Columbia
and eastern Canada have benefitted from the export, since the pipe lines
might not have been built but for the export market and the revenue from
export has helped to decrease the cost of operating the line.
140 Borden Commission, First Report. Even the Royal Commission attempted very
little discussion of its recommendation that export be permitted under licence. Attention
was focussed on formulae for determining surplus and price terms in contracts.
147NEB Report (August, 1970), p. 10-1 -2. The writer does not intend to imply
that the Board does not take into account other considerations. Indeed in this Report,
the Board considered the term of export, the benefits of scale to Canadians accruing
from the operation of a wholly export-oriented pipe line, protection of Canadian interest
from the contracting practices of gas distribution utilities, and other matters, some of
which are discussed in this paper.
1481n particular, natural gas which supplies approximately 1/3 of U.S. energy requirements is in short supply, partly as a result of increased demand for gas, since it is
very low in sulphur content and hence not a major pollutant like crude oil, and also
because the discovery of U.S. gas reserves has decreased substantially in recent years.
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When Consolidated applied for a certificate and licence for a pipe line
the Board was faced with the question of whether the line would be in the
public interest. The question was complicated by the fact that there was a
deficiency relative to the amount of gas applied for.149 In rejecting the Consolidated application the Board indicated that the economies of scale were an
important factor:
In approaching the problem of assessment of the merits of individual application,
the Board holds that, as part of its responsibility for making allowance for
requirements for gas for use in Canada, it must bear in mind the need for sound
development of those pipe line transmission systems which are the means of providing gas service to Canadian consumers. The carrying of gas should be a profitable activity, which when undertaken by transmission systems serving Canadian
customers, should make available to such customers a share in the economies of
scale and such benefits as may arise from the contribution of exports to the
financial health of the transmisisoa system. In effect this means that where a
choice has to be made between licencing exports by a project wholly oriented
towards exports and a project which serves Canadian customers and export
customers, if all other factors were equal the choice would have to be in favour
of the project serving Canadian as well as export customers. 150

This was a good decision on the Boards' part, and this policy is weighted
strongly in favour of ensuring benefit to Canada from the operation of pipe

lines.
The Board's policies towards development of Canadian natural gas
resources are not as clear. The problem here arises from the question of what
rate the development of resources should proceed at. The producers argue that
exports are important to provide an incentive to exploration and hence encourage development of reserves, which will protect Canadian requirements.
Accordingly at the hearings they are usually at issue with the protection requested for Canadian requirements by the parties tied to the Canadian consumer market (such as Trans-Canada). The problem with this assertion,
however, is that Canada already has sufficient established reserves to protect
Canadian requirements for at least 20 years, and accordingly the development, at least at the rate desired by producers is not required for protection
of the Canadian market. The Board would appear, however, to have made
a choice to encourage present development:""'
...The Board agrees with the producers and those who speak for them that
estimates of Canadian requirements must be realistic and that those included in
the forecasts must be reasonable. An unallocated "contingency allowance" in the
requirements estimate might indeed result in unnecessarily locked-in reserves of
gas, loss to producers, and discouragement of exploration and development.

Since Canadian requirements are protected it seems clear that this development is directed to the export market. Indeed the Board noted the increasing
U.S. market requirements and the U.S. gas shortage. 152 But it is not clear from
the decision what benefits will accrue to Canada from continuing to supply
that market and encouraging development of gas reserves to accomplish
14 9 The application for export totalled 8.9 Tef and the Board determined that there
was an exportable surplus of 6.4 Tcf. Thus it would be necessary to refuse one of the
applications or alternatively share the supply among the applicants. NEB Report
(August, 1970), at 10-14.
15o NEB Report (August, 1970), at 10-14 -15. Also at 10-42, -43.
151 d., at 10-8 -9.
152Id., at 10-9.
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that end. While the Board does discuss the export price, 53 it does not evaluate the effects on the Canadian petrochemical industry, whether detrimental or beneficial, nor the lost benefit of using this energy in Canada.
The Board does, however, indicate that it expects Canada to benefit
from "reliable accessibility of export markets for Canadian crude oil."' 5 4
This is a reference to the U.S. import controls on crude oil from Western
Canada. But it is questionable whether this would be a benefit, since the same
questions about the benefit from the export of crude oil 55 arise, as with
natural gas.
With certain exceptions (such as analysis of benefits of scale) the Board's
decisions have not evidenced any consideration of the underlying policy
questions in considering Canadian gas export policy. This is not to say that
exports have not been or will not be in Canada's interests, but the analysis
to date has been very limited and has not considered the fundamental issues.
(2) Determination of Surplus
It has been suggested earlier in this paper that one of the main considerations of the Board, though not the only one, is the determination of whether
there is a surplus of gas, as required by the Act:
*the Board shall satisfy itself that
(a) the quantity of gas ...to be exported does not exceed the surplus remaining
after due allowance has been made for the reasonably foreseeable requirements
for use in Canada having regard in the case of an application to export gas to
the trends of discovery of gas in Canada...156

The determination of whether a surplus exists becomes a major focus of the
Board's attention in its decisions. However, since the determination is a very
technical one the writer will only review some of the factors involved. Essentially three stages are involved:
(a) quantifying "reasonably foreseeable requirements";
(b) determining the supply of gas, present and future; and
(c) quantifying the surplus.
The accompanying table,157 the current surplus calculation from the most
recent case, demonstrates the elements involved in the calculation.
The established reserves include only proven reserves and not probable
reserves. It should be noted that reserve estimation is not an exact science and
hence there is an underlying risk involved in relying on these estimates. 58
53

1

Infra, Section 5.B(4).
Report (August, 1970).

154 NEB

155 There are no export restrictions on the export of crude oil at present. In fact,
the Canadian Government has been actively seeking increased access to U.S. markets for
Canadian crude.
't6Act.,
157

83 (a).
From NEB Report (August, 1970), at 4-38.
158

Natural gas reserve estimation is based largely on techniques used to estimate
oil reserves. Geologists have expressed considerable doubt about the techniques used
and the reliability of the estimates. See North, "Oil Reserve Forecast are Unrealistic,"
Toronto Daily Star, January 18, 1971, at 6; North, "Canada May Have Less Oil than
We Think," Id., January 19, 1971, at 6. K. F. North is a Professor of Geology, Carleton
University, formerly a petroleum geologist with Standard Oil of California); Hawkins,
"Protecting Future Gas Supply," (1969), 84 Public Utilities Fortnightly, No. 4, at 39.
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There is an allowance made for both reserves deferred for conversation purposes (that is to ensure maximum well output) and wells beyond economic
reach. The latter would include remote gas fields which cannot be connected
to transmission lines economically. It is understood that the Board bases its
estimates of reserves largely on its evaluation of well measurements carried
out by producers and the Alberta Oil and Gas Conservation Board. The
Alberta Board estimates are particularly important, and this would seem
sensible since that Board has the expertise and personnel to carry out reserve
estimates. Authorized imports' 59 are added to the above figures, to yield the
total supply.
CURRENT SURPLUS CALCULATION
(Tcf at 1000 British Thermal (heating) units per cubic foot)
Supply
Established reserves
Less reserves deferred (for conservation)
Less 12 gas considered beyond economic reach
Plus imports
Total Supply

57.4
(1.7)
(1.8)
0.1
54.0

Requirements
Canada, except Alberta
Alberta
Processing shrinkage (from removal of by-product)
Existing export licences

25.9
7.5
2.2
12.0

Total Requirements

47.6

Current Surplus
Requested Exports

6.4
8.9

Current Surplus (Deficiency)

(2.5)

159 Imports of natural gas are only authorized under licence, the same as exports.
Act, s. 81. However, as seen from the table, gas imports are relatively unimportant in
quantity. The only recent import application of which the author is aware was made
by Union Gas Company of Canada Ltd. to import 1.1 Tcf of gas, over 20 years, from
Panhandle Eastern Pipe Line Co. into Windsor, Ontario. NEB, Reasons for Decision:
In the Matter of Union Gas Company of Canada Ltd., December, 1968. The Board
refused to approve the import. Union Gas argued that the imported gas would cost
$2,000,000 less over the term of the import than gas supplied by Trans-Canada
(.1940/Mcf cheaper). However the Board concluded (at 41) that this was only a
marginal benefit and furthermore there was a strong possibility that the import would be
more expensive because of a sensitive price term in the contract and a possibility of a
U.S. rate increase. The Board concluded, at 46:
The Board believes that before it should issue an import licence and recommend
its approval to the Governor in Council, it must be satisfied that the importation
of the gas will be of some advantage to Canada. Where the alternative to importation is the use of Canadian gas, the inherent advantages of the use of indigenous
gas resources might be expected to be offset by a lesser cost of the imported gas or
by a greater availability of supply, or by some combination of these two factors.
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The evaluation of "reasonably foreseeable requirements for use in Canada" is more complex. In its analysis the Board projects Canadian requirements for a 30 year period 60° for each province and for the different market
uses.' 0 ' However the Board does not use these figures in determining surplus.
Rather, a protection level is projected by multiplying the forecast requirements
in the fourth year of the proposed export times a factor of 25.162 In the case
of Alberta, the Board uses the OGCB protection level of 30 times the
first year Alberta requirement. 03 It should be noted that there is a substantial
difference between the 30 year forecast requirements (66.9 Tcf) 6 4 and the
requirements figure used in the calculation of current surplus (33.4 Tcf). 165
This difference is due to growth forecast in Canadian requirements, which
must come from the trend gas, discussed below. The difference between the
supply and projected requirements gives the current surplus, determined here
to be 6.4 Tef. The figures adopted by the Board in its determination of requirements are obviously critical to the outcome of the application, and is
usually one of the main issues of the hearings.
The Board also calculates the future surplus which is derived by repeating the current surplus calculations at 5 year intervals for a 20 year period.
This calculation includes an allowance for trends in discovery as required by
the Act,'6' and the Board arrived at a figure of 3.5 Tcf per year, based on
the historical finding rate for the past 10 years. 167 The result of this calculation is that this historical finding rate of 3.5 Tcf per year was not sufficient to
support all the exports applied for. The calculation was performed including
the Consolidated application, which was refused. Unfortunately the Board
did not repeat the calculation using the approved exports' 68 but they commented:
It is therefore clear that the rate of discovery of the last ten years, 3.5 Tcf per
annum, will not support any large increases in exports beyond those now under
consideration, with due provision for supply for those exports, as well as Canadian requirements, either large new sources of gas in the frontier areas will have
to be established, or the rate of discovery in the portion of the Western Canadian
Sedimentary Basin already under development will have to be substantially
increased. 609
160 NEB Report (August, 1970), Chapter 3.
161 Residential, commercial, industrial, thermal-electric power generation, pipe line

losses, and fuel required to power the gas turbine-driven compressors along the pipe line.
162NEB Report (August, 1970), at 4-35.
103 This is but one example of the unique treatment given Alberta, as a result of
requirements that export applicants must show authority to remove gas from a province
in applying for an export licence. Regulations, s. 4(2) (i).
164 NEB Report (August, 1970), at 3-19.
105 That is, Canadian requirements
25.9 Tcf
Alberta requirements
7.5
Total Canadian requirements

33.4 Tcf

166 Act, s. 83 (a).

Report (August, 1970), at 4-18.
108 Furthermore, many of the figures used in the calculation are unexplained, and
it is consequently very difficult to assess the significance of the future surplus calculation.
169 NEB Report (August, 1970), at 4-41.
167NEB

1971]

OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL

It further seems clear from these calculations that future Canadianrequirements cannot be supplied from existing reserves, even including the historical
finding rate and as a result the finding rate will have to increase just to
protect Canadian use of gas.
Thus, not only is the Board encouraging immediate development of gas
reserves, but it is in fact forcing it, just to protect Canadian requirements.
It is submitted that this is due to an excessive estimate of the amount of
trend gas which may be included in the determination.
(3) Policy Towards Commitment of Canadian Gas Resources to Export
Markets
One of the problems in considering exports is the commitment of Canadian resources which may result from supplying the U.S. gas market. While
170
Canadian gas exports represent only 3% of the U.S. natural gas supply,
there are certain U.S. market areas which are supplied solely by Canadian
gas. 1 Can, or will, Canada ever cut off the gas supply to these markets?
The question arose, in 1960, in the first case before the Board. 1 72 Niagara
Gas Transmission was applying to export gas, which it purchased from TransCanada, to St. Lawrence Gas Company, at Cornwall, Ontario. The Board
rejected the application, because it was not satisfied with the price terms,
but suggested that Niagara re-apply. In its evaluation of the application the
Board noted that the gas purchase contract made no provision for increments
in market demand, after 1963, and that Trans-Canada would be the sole
supplier source of gas to be supplied to the area, and commented:
... acceptance of the present application would imply acceptance of some responsibility to supply, within a short period and thereafter, additional gas to meet
the peak load growth of the area, or else would imply a rather casual view by
the Board of the responsibilities of Canada in commencing a strictly limited supply
of gas to a wholly dependant export market. Neither implication is acceptable
to the Board.'73

Upon hearing a revised application by Niagara, 174 the Board approved
the export licence, being satisfied with the price terms, but elaborated on
the problem of Canada being the sole supplier. The Board considered the
effect of the export on the competitive position of industries of the two countries, but was satisfied that there would be no disadvantage to Ontario, since
gas was available in Southwestern and Central Ontario at prices which were
at least as favourable as the export price. 175 This would not seem to be
17 0 The NEB projects that will increase to 15% by 1990.

17'Examples are the Montana market, supplied by the Canadian-Montana Pipe
Line Company, the northern New York and the Vermont market supplied by the TransCanada system, and the Upper New York State market supplied by the Trans-Canada
system, through Niagara Gas Transmission in Canada. In addition several small U.S.
border communities are supplied by the Trans-Canada main line.
172NEB Report (March, 1960), Chapter 10.
173 Id., at 12-26 -27.
174 NEB, Report to the Governor in Council: In the Matter of the Application
under the National Energy Board Act of Niagara Gas Transmission Ltd., May 31, 1960.
175 Id., at 10. This factor which is essentially a consideration of the benefit to
Canada from using gas domestically rather than for export, to improve the competitive
position of Canadian industry from a supply of inexpensive energy has not been discussed elsewhere by the Board to the writer's knowledge.
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adequate. Surely Canadian gas should be used to improve the competitive
position of Canadian industry. They also considered the advisability of
impairing Trans-Canada's ability to satisfy the potential peak requirements
of its customers, but concluded with respect to the export that it would be
"consistent with Canadian-United States relations to allow the export of gas
to small communities lying adjacent to the international boundary where this
does not cause undue difficulties in Canada," and that since the volume was
small, the situation was unlikely to cause embarassment to Canada or the
United States. 7 6 They added a caveat to their approval, advising the parties
that the Board could not undertake to issue a future licence for the incremental demand in the market, which would have to be considered at the time
of an application, and that the Board could not commit the Governor in
Council to validate any licence.' 77 The Board did not satisfy its own objections
to U.S. market dependance, raised in its first decision. The decision would
seem to imply that the Board is willing to make a future commitment to the
market, in spite of its caveat.
The Federal Power Commission has been concerned with the converse
question: is it the United States' interest to allow an area to become dependant on Canadian gas supplies? The question arose in the Westcoast application to supply gas to the Pacific Northwest states and in 1954 the Commission concluded:
Regardless of the long and cherished friendly relations with any neighbour nation
able to supply such area with natural gas, it would not be in the public interest
to permit the importation of its gas as the sole source for the consumers in need
of an uninterruptible supply at a reasonable price, which178should always be assured
by this Commission to the full extent of its powers.

The Commission later approved the modified import scheme on the basis of
a supply of gas supplementary to domestic supplies. It should be noted that
Canada had aproved this export through the issue by the Minister, in 1953,
of an export licence, with apparently no concern for the dependance of the
U.S. market on Canada.
The FPC has subsequently changed its position and has permitted
Canadian gas to become the sole source for several U.S. markets.' Ta The
pressures in U.S. markets for additional natural gas is such that the FPC
would be willing to become more dependant on Canadian supplies. But this
should make Canada wary since freedom in export policy formulation then
becomes compromised by the presence of a large dependant market.
A problem arises from the very existence of a Canadian pipe line connected to a U.S. market. There will be a continuing pressure on the Board
to permit exports through the line at its capacity, from the pipe line company, as well as the markets being supplied. Thus it is questionable how
170

Id., at 12.

177 Id.,

at 19.

(1954) 13 FPC 221. See Miller, Foreign Trade in Gas and Electricity-A
Legal and Historical Study (1970), at 100 ff., 195 ff.
17 0 Miller, op. cit., at 195-201. The position was restated recently in Re the Montana
Power Company, Opinion No. 555, (1969) 77 P.U.R. 3d 478, in respect of imports
from the Canadian-Montana Pipe Line.
178
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realistic it is to expect that after the expiry of a licence the Board would
refuse to issue a new licence. Indeed there would be a pressure on the Board
to authorize the line to be used to its capacity. The Board considered this in
rejecting the Consolidated proposal:
Whatever disclaimer might be set forth as to any commitment or obligation to
authorize increments of export beyond the original, the suppliers, owners, and
customers of a pipe line which is not used to its full capacity all have a strong
incentive to use every means to ensure its repletion. Once a large diameter pipe
line is in place, the "cheap expansibility" available in it gives its owners a very
powerful lever in seeking supply contracts and authorizations to develop the
system to optimum capacity, but the cost of service concept makes it unlikely that
Canada would receive the
full value of gas exported in the later stages of develop80
ment of such a system.'

Coupled with the Board's reservations about wholly export-oriented pipe
lines, this represents a very useful approach to export of natural gas, and in
the writer's opinion is one of the best indications of the protection that the
Board has insisted upon, so as to maximize the benefit to Canada of natural
gas exports.
However, at the same time the Board has indicated that it considers
export licences to be firm commitments and virtually rules out the possibility
of altering a licence:
Although section 17 of the Act enables the Board to review its decisions, and,
with the approval of the Governor in Council, to alter a licence issued by it,
it is a premise of the Board's approach to the licencing of the export of natural
gas that, once a licence for firm export for a fixed period has been issued, it
should not be diminished in effect or put in jeopardy so long as the conditions
of the licence are observed. Such reliability of licences is desirable both in equity
to producers, exporters, United States importers and consumers of the gas licenced
for export, and in the interest of orderly development of relations between
Canada and the United States in respect of natural gas. But the Act contemplates
that Canadian requirements be given first preference. In order to minimize potential conflict of these objectives, it is necessary to use reasonable caution in
ensuring that provision for Canadian requirements is adequate.' 8 '

The implication of this statement is to virtually repeal s.17 of the Act which
provides:
(1) Subject to subsection (2), the Board may review, rescind, change, alter or
vary any order or decision made by it, or may rehear any application before deciding it.
(2) The Board may change, alter or vary a certificate or licence issued by it
but no such change, alteration or variation is effective until approved by the
Governor in Council.

In discussions with the Chairman of the Board, it was indicated that the
wording of this statement was too strong and it does not mean that the Board
will not review a licence, however,
he re-iterated the Board policy in favour
82
of the firmness of contracts.
180 NEB Report (August, 1970) at 10-41 -42. The cost of service type of contract
adds on transportation costs to the wellhead price of gas and does not relate the export
price to the price of other forms of energy in the market where the gas is sold. This is
discussed infra, Section 5. C(4).
181 Id., at 10-8.
182 The effect of the policy is altered somewhat by Regulations, s. 1lA which directs
the Board to review the price of exports. See infra, Section 5.C(4).
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While the Regulations8 3 and the Act 84 provide that exports shall be for
a maximum period of 25 years, in 1970 the Board concluded that exports
should be authorized for periods less than 25 years. This was based on concern that the price of a gas export might not be satisfactory in the future
because of rapidly changing U.S. market conditions and because of concern
with the accelerated rate of take from reserves which was resulting in a situation where a considerable portion of the term of an export would have to be
provided for out of future discoveries. Consequently the Board reduced the
term of the licences to 15 years and indicated that in future the term might
be reduced even further.8 5 From the viewpoint of financing pipe lines this
could raise problems, since they have traditionally been financed through debt
instruments, linked to contracts for supply, sales for 20 to 25 year terms.
However the Board rejected the applicability of such "conventional wisdom"
in the current energy market, at least in respect of established pipe line enterprises and served notice on producers, transmission agencies, export purchasers and Canadian gas distributors to change their contracting practices in
anticipation of "relatively short export licences."' 18 6
The approach taken by the Board in reducing the term of export licences
is in the Canadian public interest and will reduce some of the risks arising
from the firm commitments made in respect of exports.
(4)

The Price of Exports

The problem here lies with the nature of the contractual arrangements
in the natural gas industry. Unlike the oil industry where producers contract
for relatively small quantities of oil for short periods, of less than one year,
the natural gas industry developed a system where transmission companies in
order to finance their pipe lines, insisted on long term commitments from
gas producers, for 20 to 25 years. In the early stages of development of the
natural gas industry there was a buyer's market for gas and consequently gas
purchase contracts were fixed price arrangements, the transmission company
paying a fixed price to the producer and the distributor paying a fixed price
to the transmission company (although there was often allowance for increased transmission costs). This contributed in part to very low consumer
prices for natural gas, since gas prices would not fluctuate to reflect the energy
market.
Earlier in this paper, the background of the Westcoast gas export contract
of 1954 was discussed and it was shown how the unsatisfactory nature of the
price of the contract, which resulted from the uneven bargaining power of the
parties and the pressure exerted by the FPC, led to dissatisfaction with the
current export arrangements and was one of the factors leading to the esta87
blishment of the NEB.1
In the 1960's the market demand for natural gas changed drastically and
consequently most-favoured-nation clauses (where a gas purchaser would
183 Regulations, s. 9.
184 Act, s. 85(b).
185NEB Report (August, 1970), at 10-16 -18.
180 Id., at 10-20 -22.

187 Supra, Section 2.
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pay a producer the same price as he paid to all other producers) and escalation clauses (either a fixed increase per year or tied to the price of either gas
supplies in the market area) became the prevalent practice. Thus in 1967,
Westcoast and its American customer, El Paso Natural Gas, agreed to a new
pricing arrangement in which the 1954 contract would be absorbed into a
new contract which included an escalation clause. The Board approved the
export188 but the FPC refused to approve the price term 89 and the result
was a major confrontation between the two regulatory bodies.' 90 Ultimately
the two bodies approved a compromise contract, which represented a substantial improvement over the prior contractual arrangements. 19 1 These cases
will be discussed only in reference to the price criteria which emerged.
It will be recalled that the Act 92 requires that the Board be satisfied that
... the price to be charged by an applicant for gas or power exported by him
is just and reasonable in relation to the public interest.

before issuing an export licence. Earlier in the paper' 9 3 the writer suggested
that this requirement might be read very broadly to require the Board to examine the costs and benefits of the proposed export to Canada. The Board has
not interpreted the provision in this way but has taken a narrower view,
restricted to a consideration of the costs incurred by the parties and the prices
paid in the markets in Canada and the U.S. In the Westcoast case, when the
Board refused to approve the export terms required by the FPC, the Board
stated its criteria to be: 194
(1) the export price must recover its appropriate share of the costs incurred;
(2) the export price should, under normal circumstances, not be less than the
price to Canadians for similar deliveries in the area;
(3) the export price should not result in prices in the United States market area
materially less than the cost alternative for energy from indigenous sources.

The first test requires as a minimum price the cost of service, that is the

exporting company must recover all its cost, including provisions for increased costs.
The second test is a direct result of the Westcoast situation, discussed
earlier, where as a result of FPC pressure Westcoast agreed to very unfavourable contracts for the export from B.C. to the Pacific Northwest market.
The Borden Commission examined these arragements in which the gas was
188 NEB, Report to the Governor in Council: In the Matter of the Application
under the National Energy Board Act of Westcoast Transmission Company Ltd., March,
1967.
189Re El Paso Natural Gas Company, Opinion No. 526, (1967), 70 P.U.R.
190 See Miller, op. cit., at 99-111 for a good discussion of this case.
' 9 1 NEB, Reasons for Decision In the Matter of the Application under the National
Energy Board Act of Westcoast Transmission Company Limited, December, 1967.
Hereinafter, "NEB Report (December, 1967)". (The NEB refused to approve the price
terms required by the FPC in its 1967 decision.) NEB, Id., February, 1968. (In which
the NEB approved the compromise contract); Re El Paso Natural Gas Company,
(1968), 72 P.U.S. 3d 385 (Giving approval to the import permit).
192 Act, s. 83(b).
293 Supra, Section 5. B.

194 NEB Report (December, 1967), at 7-1. The Board applied the same criteria
in the 1970 decision, NEB Report (August, 1970), at 5-31.
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being exported at 22€/Mcf but being sold to B.C. customers in Vancouver
for 32€/Mcf. A study prepared for the Commission concluded that the operating profits of Westcoast were coming solely from the Canadian consumer
and no profit was being made by Westcoast from the export. 195 While these
facts are startling it should be pointed out that the B.C. consumer was receiving a very real benefit from the export, since without the export the Vancouver
market would not have been able to support the pipe line from Northern
British Columbia and hence Southern B.C. would not have been serviced by
gas until considerably later. These arrangements have been varied considerably as a result of the 1967 conflict of the FPC and NEB.
The third test presents difficulty because of the long term contracting
arrangements in the gas industry. In 1970 the Board found that the consolidated export would result in the sale of Canadian natural gas in the U.S. at
prices substantially lower than competing energy costs since the contract was
based on the cost of service approach and consequently would not reflect the
future market conditions. This led the Board to express further doubt about
wholly export oriented contracts since they are based on a cost of service
approach:
It can be said that the projects which are wholly oriented for export can meet
this third test, if at all, only by coincidence at occasional periods in the life of
the porjects. This follows because the cost of service approach, upon which they
are based, by definition ignores the price of alternative energy sources in the
market area, except to the extent that such prices constitute a ceiling on the
price at which the exported gas may be sold to the extend that the prices received
for gas exported fall short of reflecting the value of the gas in the market area,
the revenue foregone may be described as the "cost of the cost of service," which
is ultimately borne by Canadians.196

The Board consequently rejected the Westcoast application. The solution seen
by the Board to the problem is two-fold: shorter term contracts and exports,
and a continuing review of export contracts. The latter was expressed in a
new regulation passed by Cabinet immediately prior to the approval of the
export licences in September, 1970:
11A. (1) Every licence for the exportation of gas is, in addition to any other
terms and conditions imposed by or under the Act, subject to the condition that
the price to be charged for gas, the export of which is authorized under the
licence, shall be subject to review by the Board, and where, in the opinion of the
Board there has been a significant increase in prices for competing gas supplies
or for alternative energy sources, the Board shall report its findings and recommendations to the Governor in Council.
(2) Where the price to be charged for gas, the export of which is authorized under

a licence, is reviewed and reported on by the Board pursuant to subsection (1),

the Governor in Council may by order establish a new price below which gas

exported under the authority of that licence may not be sold or delivered after
such date as may be specified in the order.
(3) Where an order is made pursuant to subsection (2), it is a condition of
the licence in relation to which the order is made that gas exported under the
authority of that licence shall not be sold or delivered at a price below the new
price after the date specified in the order.' 97
105 Borden

Commission, First Report, at 21-24.
10oNEB Report (August, 1970), at 10-15 -16.
'97 Regulations, s.

IlA added by P.C. 1970-1706. Since the regulation was passed

prior to the new export licences, it is clear that it applies to them, but it is not clear
whether it applies to prior licences.
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The Chairman of the Board had indicated that he doubted that an order
would be made and that he would not want to use the power, except in
extreme circumstances. Rather, he viewed this as a pressure device which
would encourage the industry to "co-operate" with the Board and change
their contracting practices.
As has been seen, the contracting practices of the gas industry have
changed drastically in the last 20 years. Now that there is a shortage of energy
it remains to be seen how effective the Board will be in securing the benefit
of this situation to Canada. Certainly, the writer considers that the changes
proposed by the Board in 1970 represent a considerable improvement in the
Canadian position, at least in respect to the price at which gas is sold. However, the criticism offered earlier is repeated. The Board should in its consideration of export prices analyze the benefits and costs to Canada from
export of natural gas.
6. THE ROLE OF THE CABINET AND ITS RELATIONSHIP
TO THE BOARD
The relationship of the Cabinet and the Board is a strange mix of independence and direct control. The Members of the Board are appointed by
the Cabinet, but are given independence by their term of office (7 years). 08
In its advisory functions the Board reports to the Minister of Energy, Mines
99
and Resources, and the Minister may require the Board to carry out studies.1200
The Board is further required to submit an annual report to the Minister,
and the Minister answers for the Board in the House of Commons.
In its regulatory functions, particularly the issuing of certificates and
licences, the Board is required to act independently by the Act since it 20is1
required to be satisfied that the criteria of the Act are complied with.
However, the Cabinet maintains ultimate control over these functions since
it is required to approve all certificates and licenses. 20 2 The question which
logically follows is which body sets the policies? Certainly it is clear to the
writer from an interview with the Chairman that there are no discussions
lO8Act, ss. 3(1), (2).
199 Id., s. 22. The Minister even controls the publication of all studies and reports,
s.23.
2001d., s.91.

Id., ss. 44, 83.
s. 44 (certificates); Regulations, s. 8 (licences). An argument may be
offered to challenge the validity of the Cabinet approval requirement in respect of
licences. Gas may only be exported under the authority of Part VI of the Act. (s. 81)
This authority may arise through a licence issued by the Board (s. 82(1) ) or through
other means provided in the regulations (s. 81 "Except as provided in the regulations").
The regulations do provide two further methods of exports by orders, discussed supra,
Section 4.A. In issuing licences the Board is "subject to the regulations" (s. 82(1) ).
However the authority to pass regulations is limited ("regulations for carrying into
effect the purposes and provisions of this Part," s. 85). It is submitted that Cabinet
approval does not carry into effect the purposes or provisions of Part VI, since the
201

202 Id.,

Part contemplates a system where the Board decides. Certainly the Cabinet could not

authorize an export without involving the Board. Furthermore the regulations are
tied to the purposes and provisions of Part VI and hence one cannot look to the Cabinet control over the Board through the advisory functions of Part II.
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between the Board and Cabinet members in respect of particular applications.
However this does not answer the question with respect to policy decisions
and evaluation of the public interest. The analysis may really be circular.
Most of the expertise in energy matters lies with the Board and the Minister
has only a small staff of energy experts. Thus it may be that influence is
exerted by the Board on the formulation of Government policy, which in turn
influences the Board's decisions.
The writer is unaware of any statements by the Board that it considers
itself bound by Government policy. The Chairman commented, however, in
discussion with the writer, that he felt a duty to "take note" of Government
policy as stated in the House of Commons and he also said that the Board
takes note of Cabinet approval of licences and considers this approval of the
criteria enunciated in the Board's Reports, calling this a form of "economic
jurisprudence".
The only occasion where the Cabinet refused to approve an export
licence approved by the Board arose in the Great Lakes case. This is probably one of the most fascinating examples of the working of government. 203
By the early 1960's the Eastern Canadian gas market had grown so rapidly
that the Trans-Canada line through Northern Ontario was at its capacity and
Trans-Canada had to increase the flow of gas to the market. Faced with two
possible approaches - looping the line through the rough terrain of Northern
Ontario or building a new line south of the Great Lakes through the U.S. the company chose the latter, which it estimated would be much less expensive
and would result in lower transmission costs for Eastern Canadian consumers.
As a result of the strong opposition which was presented at the initial FPC
proceedings by American Natural, which proposed to build a line through
the same area to carry gas on behalf of Trans-Canada, the two companies
agreed to a joint venture with equal ownership of the line, with the further
advantage to Trans-Canada that it would have an American market which
would enable them to use the line to its capacity in its early stages, improving
the economic feasability of the line.
There was strong opposition to the project from two quarters, as discussed earlier. Northern Natural of the U.S. proposed a displacement project
instead of the direct line, but this was unacceptable to Trans-Canada in light of
the Canadian policy dating to the early 1950's against such a scheme.204
There was also strong opposition to the project from parties in Northern
Ontario who wanted the line to go through the area, to gain the obvious economic benefits. In August, 1966, the NEB approved the project.20 5 However, the Board's decision expressed serious doubts about the project, includ20 3

See Kilbourn, op. cit., at 167-193 for a more complete discussion of the events
surrounding this case.
204 Northern's opposition was strong both at NEB and FPC hearings. In fact they
carried the matter to an anti-trust suit in the U.S. when the FPC authorized the line,
alleging that the joint venture of the two companies was in violation of U.S. anti-trust
laws. The question was not finally settled until July, 1970, Re Great Lakes Gas Transmission Company, Opinion No. 580 (FPC). In the meantime the line had been approved by the FPC which allowed the construction and operation of the line to continue
pending the final outcome of the legal proceedings.
205 NEB Report (August, 1966).
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ing concern about whether the means of transmission should become established in another country subject to foreign regulatory control, the effect on
the balance of payments, the loss of the benefits of the extensive construction
programme, and doubts about whether the Great Lakes proposal would really
be more economical in the long run. The decision raised so many doubts
about the project that one is left wondering why the Board approved the
application. It would seem that the Board had decided to leave the final
decision to the Cabinet based on the Board's analysis of the proposal.
200
On August 25, 1966, the Cabinet refused to approve the project,
noting all the factors presented by the Board and concluded that it was not in
Canadas' interest that a main line carrying gas to Canadian consumers be
located outside the country. The Cabinet statement commented:

In its reasons for decision, the Board drew the attention of the Governor in
Council to207aspects of the public interest which extend beyond its field of responsibility.

This would seem to confirm the writer's doubts about the Board's disposition
of the application, and raises serious questions about the Board's role in
regulating the export of natural gas. The Cabinet comment certainly indicates
an intention to retain control over certain aspects of the public interest. We
are thus left with a strange situation where the deciding body, under the Act,
is ostensibly the Board, but in practice it is the Cabinet which makes the
important policy decisions.
The picture is complicated by the events that followed the Cabinet rejection on August 24, 1966. Trans-Canada entered into direct negotiation with
Cabinet ministers (and a flurry of lobbying followed) and two days after
the announcement the Minister of Trade and Commerce expressed interest
in a company proposal that the Great Lakes line should never carry more
than one half of the supply for Eastern Canada.208 Shortly after, a meeting
was held, attended by senior Cabinet ministers and a formidable group of
Canadian businessmen. Coincident with these negotiations a conference of
provincial premiers was being held in Ottawa, and the premiers of Alberta,
Manitoba, Ontario and Quebec were seeking to have the Cabinet decision
reconsidered. Alberta was concerned about gas markets while the others were
concerned about the price effects. The Cabinet reversed its decision on October
4, 1966,209 approving an arrangement which would require a minimum of
50% of gas destined for Eastern Canada to be carried by the Canadian line.
The role of the Board in the events between August 25 and October 4
Was clearly subordinate to that of the Cabinet. It is understood that no Board
members participated in the Cabinet discussions with the Trans-Canada pro206

Office of the Prime Minister, Press Release, August 25, 1966.

207Id., at 1. Emphasis added. This represented adherence to the Canadian policy

which originated in the 1950's, that the main line supplying gas to Eastern Canada
should be located entirely in Canada under exclusive Canadian control.
20
s Kilbourn, op. cit., at 182.
209 Office of the Prime Minister, Press Release, October 4, 1966. Kilbourn op. cit.,
at 182.
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ponents. 210 The Cabinet referred the modified proposal to the Board for consideration, in its advisory capacity, but a public hearing was not held by the
Board and there was no opportunity for the intervenors to comment on the
proposal. The Cabinet stated in announcing its new decision:
The Board has also informed the Cabinet that in its view, the undertakings given
and representations made by Trans-Canada are an adequate and acceptable res25 for not apponse to the reasons given the Government statement of August
2 11
proving the certificate and licences sought by the Company.

Thus the final decision was taken by the Cabinet and it was the Cabinet's
policy which was applied. What is most disturbing is the complete change of
position taken by the Cabinet in 6 weeks. In the writers' opinion the modified
plan was not really a major departure from that which the Cabinet had
earlier rejected. What made the Cabinet change its decision? It would seem
to the writer that major factors were the pressure applied by the provincial
premiers and the strong statement made by the President of Imperial Oil of
Canadae2 2 in favour of the Great Lakes scheme at the September 9th meeting.
The Great Lakes case leaves a good deal of confusion about the respective roles of the Cabinet and the Board. If the effect of this decision is to
discourage the Board from considering the difficult policy questions raised in
considering the export of natural gas, then it is a turn in the wrong direction
in the development of the Board's role in decision-making in respect of export
policy. However the Board appears to have strengthened its role in subsequent
decisions. This is seen in the Board's decision in the Westcoast case 213 and in
particular in its 1970 decision 214 in which the Board formulated new methods
of protecting the Canadian public interest.
The criticisms in this section concerning the role of the Cabinet should
not be interpreted to mean that the Cabinet should not be involved in the
process. Quite the contrary. Since the export of natural gas and energy policy
in general is a matter of national interest, the formulation of policies towards
export must involve the Cabinet. But it is important, in the writer's view, that
a statement of policy be made which will clarify Canada's position. If the
Board is to be influenced by Government policy, which it should be, and if the
present system whereby exports are authorized in an ajudicatory proceeding is
to continue, it is in Canada's interests that a clear public statement of energy
export policy be made. This should be done by the Cabinet with the advice
of the Board. The Board should also hold public hearings, in which all interest
groups should be encouraged to participate, in order to assist it in considering
the costs and benefits to Canada from the export of energy, and natural gas
in particular. Such hearings are clearly within the Board's jurisdiction and
would be beneficial to the formulations of a clear policy by the Cabinet together with the Board.
210 The Chairman informed the writer that the Minister had asked the Board if it
objected to the Cabinet dealing directly with Trans-Canada but the Board did not
object, since it had already indicated its approval for the project as applied for.
211 Office of the Prime Minister, Press Release, October 4, 1966, at 2.
212 Kilbourn, op. cit., at 182.
213 NEB Report (December, 1967).
214 NEB Report (August, 1970).
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7. THE FRAMEWORK OF CANADIAN-AMERICAN RELATIONS
IN THE TRADE OF NATURAL GAS
Since the early 1950's the trade between Canada and the United States
in natural gas has grown to considerable proportions and it appears likely
to continue. In the future the relationship between the two countries in
matters of energy trade will become the focus of far greater attention than
we have seen to date, as a result of the development of energy resources in
the northern regions of Canada and Alaska. At the time of writing this paper
the construction of a pipe line carrying Alaskan oil to the lower 48 states is
the subject of considerable attention. There are also discussions between the
two governments concerning increased sale of Canadian energy to the U.S.
In this section the writer will consider the existing framework of CanadianAmerican relations and whether it is appropriate for the future.
In the case of natural gas, the two regulatory agencies - the NEB and
the FPC - are the dominant bodies making decisions but the framework of
trade is the export contract of private parties. Governments do not initiate
exports (or imports) - they merely approve them - and decisions of the
two bodies are made independently of each other. This system has been
compared earlier with the system that existed before the NEB was established
and the writer commented on the unsatisfactory nature of the previous
arrangements, to Canada, as evidenced by the Westcoast export case in 1954.
Certainly the situation has improved as a result of the appearance of the NEB,
particularly since the 1967 Westcoast decision. But how does the system
resolve conflicting Canadian and American natural gas trade policies? The
1967 Westcoast conflict came about as the inevitable result of the independently formulated policies of the two bodies, concerning terms of trade in
natural gas. It would seem inevitable that new NEB policies announced in the
1970 decision, concerning the term of export contracts and especially the
policy concerning export prices215 will lead to future confrontations. Does this
confrontation between regulatory bodies really accomplish anything? In the
Westcoast case the NEB emerged as the apparent winner. Although in form
the price of the contract approved was a compromise, the Board succeeded in
introducing escalation clauses in export contracts. But is independent unilateral action the best method?
In 1960 the Joint United States-Canadian Committee on Trade and
Economic Affairs called for close cooperation between the NEB and FPC.
Subsequent meetings in 1964 and 1967 produced communiques favouring
closer cooperation between the two countries. 216 There have been talks between the Prime Minister and President concerning trade in oil and these
217
resulted in a lessening of U.S. oil import restrictions on Canadian crude.
215 Regulations, s. 11A.
216 Miller, op. cit., at 293-295. Canada maintains an officer in the Canadian Em-

bassy in Washington as a liaison with the official title, Counsellor (Energy).
217 The Board made guarded comments in its 1970 decision implying that accessibility of Canadian crude oil and sulphur to U.S. markets would become a condition
precedent to future gas exports. NEB Report (August, 1970), at 10-10 -11.

OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL

(VOL. 9, NO. 3

as a result of coopeIt is not clear, however, whether Board policy is formed
21
ration or agreements between the two governments. 8
The Members and Commissioners meet informally periodically 219 and
the staff of the two agencies are in continual contact on technical matters. The
Chairman of the NEB emphasized to the writer that the meetings never discuss the disposition of particular applications. Discussions have covered
topics such as the position of the two countries in respect of reserves and surplus and the criteria used to evaluate these factors, as well as policies in
regard to prices and the general policies of Canada towards natural gas export.
If Canada and the United States are to agree to follow policies which
will affect the pattern of energy trade then the Canadian public should be
aware of what these policies are so that informed discussion debate may
follow and all the implications may be fully discussed. It might be that if
trade in energy is to increase substantially in the future then such matters
should be the subject of direct and open arrangements between the two
Governments, based on publicly stated policies.
8. CONCLUSIONS
While the statement of the issues and problems concerning the export of
natural gas is relatively simple, their resolution is not, and serious doubts and
reservations remain about the most basic question: should Canada export
natural gas? There has not been sufficient analysis by the Board of the benefits
and costs of the export issue. While gas exports have benefitted Canada, the
future is not clear. These doubts lead to the conclusion that it is not in
Canada's interests to export gas. Part of the problem is that only future generations will know if the policies have worked. And it is imperative that this
question be analyzed carefully before any further comments are made.
More definite comments were offered about the National Energy Board,
in particular the absence of analysis by the Board of the question posed
218 It is interesting to note that the Borden Commission recommended:

That, if possible, reciprocal arrangements be made with the United States of
America for a Commissioner of the Federal Power Commission of that country
to sit as an ad hoe observer, but without vote, when the National Energy Board
is considering any application for a licence for the export of natural gas from
Canada to the United States; and for a member of the National Energy Board
to sit as an ad hoe observer, but without vote, when the Federal Power Commission is considering the correlative application for the licence to import from
or export to Canada such natural gas.
Borden Commission, First Report, p. 47. The Government however rejected the recommendation since it would be "embarrassing for either government to have the regulatory
agency of the other government make decisions adverse to its own interest when a member of its own regulatory agency had participated in the events leading up to such a
decision."
Canada, House of Commons, 4 Debates 3924 (May 29, 1959). However, s. 22(2)
of the Act requires the Board to recommend arrangements for cooperation between
governmental agencies.
210
The most recent meeting the writer is aware of was in July of 1969. The discussion included the prospects of gas supply in North America, particularly Northern
Canada and Alaska and the respective procedures of the two bodies in relation to the
laws governing the agencies. NEB, "National Energy Board Meets with Federal Power
Commission," July 14, 1969. (Press Release).
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above - should gas be exported? All the Board's decisions seem to start
from the premise that Canada should export all surplus gas if the price is
right, and proceed to calculate the surplus and consider the price. The
Board's policies clearly favour encouraging the present (as opposed to future)
development of natural gas resources. Only future generations will know if
this is wise. However a change was noted in Board policies over the last four
years and the 1970 decision has introduced new policies (shorter export
terms and better price protection) which should remove some of the uncertainties and ensure greater benefits to Canada from exports.
Doubts were also expressed about the appropriateness of current export
application proceedings as a means of disposing of these issues. In particular
the apparent absence of public involvement (except for the provinical representation) prompt suggestion that there should be periodic public hearings
to re-evaluate export policy, held by the Board, separate and distinct from
hearings of individual applicants, and public interest groups should be encouraged to participate.
The Board should continue to play a major role in formulating policy,
and the present procedure whereby the Board issues licences is preferable to
the pre-1959 system where the Minister issued the licence with no hearings.
In its decisions the Board should be influenced by Government policy, formulated with the advice of the Board, but these policies must be clearly
stated. If the result of the Great Lakes case, and the Cabinet's disposition of
the case, in particular the comment that certain matters of public interest are
beyond the Board's responsibility, is to decrease the Board's role in evaluating
the public interest then this is a most unfortunate development. Certainly the
Board should not act independently of the Government but it was established
to consider and protect the public interest and should not abdicate this
function.
Finally reservations about the framework of Canadian-American relations in the trade of natural gas are repeated. If Canada is to continue to
export natural gas to the United States then this must be the result of deliberate Government decisions and the terms of this trade should be arrived at
as the result of Government policy, not the decisions of private industry
parties. Negotiations between the countries should continue as a basis for
defining the trade, but the public should be aware of exactly what agreements or arrangements have been made and what benefit they will bring to
Canada.
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